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COMMENT
Options Traders, Rule 10b-5, and Standing:
Making Sense of It All
"The last decade has been one of dramatic change and growth in the
securities market. One evolution has been the emergence and dynamic
rise of trading in options."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The establishment of the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) in
1973 provided the first national securities exchange for the trading of options
contracts. 2 In its original approval the SEC authorized trading in approxi-
mately thirty underlying issues only and limited the nature of the contracts to
call options.3 Since its inception, trading in standardized stock options 4 has pro-
liferated. As Professor Seligman noted, in 1983 options contracts in 378 under-
lying issues of publicly traded companies were listed for trading on four national
options exchanges. 5 Today no less than five national options exchanges exist,
6
and the number of listed options in publicly traded companies has grown to
approximately 530.
7
The financial community quickly recognized the options contract's effec-
tiveness as a hedge or buffer against market volatility, in addition to its novel
appeal to the more speculative investor. Legislative and regulatory bodies al-
most immediately recognized the new potential for, and subsequent increase in,
trading abuses.8 Not surprisingly, the legal profession has also entered the op-
1. Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 668 F. Supp. 358, 359 (D. Del. 1987), rev'd, 841 F.2d 502
(3d Cir. 1988), reprinted in [1987-88 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 93,655, at 98,009.
2. See Exchange Act Release No. 9985, [1972-73 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
79,212, at 82,669 (Feb. 1, 1973) [hereinafter Feb. 1973 Exchange Act Release]. For critiques of the
CBOE's maiden voyage, see generally Securities Exchange Commission, Special Study of the Options
Markets, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,945, at 81,283 (Feb. 15, 1979) [here-
inafter SEC Special Options Study]; Lipton, The Special Study of the Options Market: Its Findings
and Recommendations, 7 SEC. REG. L.J. 299 (1980).
3. See Feb. 1973 Exchange Act Release, supra note 2, at 82,670. Trading in put options was
later authorized on all national options exchanges. See Exchange Act Release No. 13,401, [1976-77
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,030, at 87,730.
4. The terms "standardized stock option(s)," "stock option(s)," and "option(s) contract(s)"
are used interchangeably throughout this Comment.
5. Seligman, The Structure of the Options Market, 10 J. CORP. L. 141, 144 (1984) (citing BAR-
RON'S, Nov. 21, 1983, at 114-20).
6. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Mar. 25, 1988, at 37-38. Included are the Chicago Board Options
Exchange (CBOE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Phila-
delphia Stock Exchange (PHILA) and Pacific Stock Exchange (PAC). Id.
7. Id. The term "listed" means the underlying issue has been authorized for trading put and
call options. See also infra notes 22-28 and accompanying text (illustrating options contracts cur-
rently available in other underlying interests).
8. See Lipton, supra note 2, at 302-05, 310-15; Seligman, supra note 5, at 142-43. See generally
SEC SPECIAL OPTIONS STUDY, supra note 2 (critiquing the CBOE's initial trading program).
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tions arena in efforts to curb such abuses and redress the new forms of investor
fraud. As the federal securities laws are increasingly tested by allegedly de-
frauded options traders,9 one recurrent issue has become prominent in recent
years: whether options traders have standing to bring actions arising under sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act") and its at-
tendant rule lOb-5.' 0 This issue will be the primary focus of this Comment and
will be examined comprehensively from two perspectives.I1
In 1975 the United States Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores 12 approved the requirement that a plaintiff must have been an ac-
tual purchaser or seller of securities in order to sustain an action brought under
section 10(b)'s rule lOb-5.' 3 This purchaser/seller requirement, known as the
Birnbaum doctrine, originated in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,' 4 in which
the Second Circuit upheld the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint for its failure to
fall within the type of fraudulent transaction against which rule lOb-5 sought to
protect.' 5 While the text of the appellate decision reads as if dismissal were
based upon jurisdictional grounds, the lower court's decision rather succinctly
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.' 6 Although the
first sections of the Blue Chip Stamps opinion are somewhat ambiguous on the
issue, the opinion's last section strongly implies, if it in fact does not expressly
state, that the purchaser/seller requirement is grounded upon the doctrine of
9. The term "options trader" will be used generically to denote either an options purchaser or
a seller. Any necessary distinction between status as a purchaser or as seller will be expressly noted
by the use of the more specific term.
10. Because it predominates in all reported cases that involve options-related section 10(b)
claims, rule 10b-5 will be the only § 10(b) rule discussed in this Comment.
Section 10(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange- ....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
Rule lOb-5 states in full:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988).
I1. See infra text immediately following note 19.
12. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
13. Id. at 754-55.
14. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
15. Id. at 464.
16. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 98 F. Supp. 507, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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standing to sue.
17
An established rule quite distinct from the Birnbaum doctrine states that
before addressing the standing issue, a court must determine that plaintiff has a
cause of action.' 8 Especially in cases that involve options trading, many courts
phrase their holdings in terms of lack of standing when in actuality they ulti-
mately dismiss due to a deficiency in the elements of the rule lob-5 claim.' 9
Thus, standing has evolved into a term of art in options cases. This unfortunate
situation necessitates a discussion of both the standing doctrine and rule lOb-5's
cause of action as applied to options traders.
Because the same ultimate result occurs whether plaintiff's complaint is
dismissed for failure to state a claim or for want of federal subject matter juris-
diction, an inquiry into the metaphysical foundations of the options cases may
appear moot because federal subject matter jurisdiction necessarily collapses
when plaintiff fails to state a rule lOb-5 cause of action. However, given the
potentially grave consequences of collateral estoppel if an action at a state level
follows from a dismissal on the federal level, the need for proper theoretical
grounds becomes clear.
20
This Comment attempts to put the standing issue as it relates to options
traders into its proper doctrinal perspective, but first some background informa-
tion is essential. Section II briefly examines the intricacies of the modem op-
tions markets. Section III discusses the modem framework of the standing
doctrine and also discusses Blue Chip Stamps in the context of the doctrinal
theory that prevailed at the time of its decision. Section IV examines the evolu-
tion of rule 10b-5's cause of action as applied to options traders up to 1980, the
year of the seminal rule lOb-5 decision of Chiarella v. United States.21 Section V
analyzes the modem options cases, those decided post-Chiarella. Here, the
Comment will analyze the elements of rule lob-5 as they apply to options trad-
ers under both the insider-trading or nondisclosure theory, and the affirmative
17. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 755 ("We therefore hold that respondent was not entitled
to sue .... ") (emphasis added); id. at 754 ("[A]n extension of standing to this respondent ......
(emphasis added)); see also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979) (majority opinion goes
to great lengths to define and distinguish standing, jurisdiction, cause of action, and relief). See
generally Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973) (addressing the
Birnbaum doctrine as a jurisdictional standing requirement), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
18. E.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453,
456 (1974) ("for it is only if such a [cause] of action exists that we need consider whether the respon-
dent had standing to bring the action .... ).
19. See, e.g., Laventhal v. General Dynamics Corp., 704 F.2d 407, 410-13 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983); Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 668 F. Supp. 358, 363-64 (D. Del. 1987),
rev'd, 841 F.2d 502 (3d Cir. 1988); Bianco v. Texas Instruments, 627 F. Supp. 154, 161 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (granting in part defendants' motions to dismiss by holding that defendant owed no duties to
plaintiff under rule lOb-5 and plaintiff therefore lacked standing).
20. As one commentator noted, many state antifraud provisions parallel, and in some instances
duplicate, federal rule lOb-5. Brooks, Rule l0b-5 in the Balance: An Analysis of the Supreme Court's
Policy Perspective, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 403, 424 (1980). However, a proclivity exists "on the part of
many [other] state courts to rely upon interpretations of rule lOb-5 by the federal courts in applying
their own [but different] antifraud statutes." Id. at 424-25. Therefore, federal courts would be wise
to dismiss a plaintiff's action on the proper theory so as to avoid inadvertently prejudicing a subse-
quent state action.
21. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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misrepresentation theory of liability. Having firmly established rule lOb-5's
availability to options traders, section VI revisits the doctrine of standing and
examines the application of the purchaser/seller requirement to the unique situ-
ation of the options trader. Finally, the Comment concludes that options trad-
ers have standing to sue under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 if they have a bona
fide cause of action and they are purchasers or sellers. The Comment further
concludes that the definitions of purchaser and seller should be flexibly tailored
to account for both the uniqueness of the options contract and the modern eco-
nomic realities that surround its use.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE STANDARDIZED OPTIONS CONTRACT
A. The Standardized Options Contract
Today's standardized options contracts are, in one sense, simply legal con-
tractual rights.22 They provide their holder with "the right to buy or sell a
specified amount of the underlying interest at a fixed or determined price (called
the exercise or strike price) upon the exercise of the option."'23 This right is
currently traded in two basic forms: the right to purchase, or "call option," and
the right to sell, or "put option."' 24 The right to buy or sell pertains to an under-
lying interest, normally in the shares of listed publicly traded companies, but
hybrids have emerged. Options contracts are also traded in more exotic under-
lying interests such as broad-based market indices,25 narrow-based market indi-
ces,2 6 United States Government debt instruments, 27 and foreign currencies. 28
The modifier standardized, as used in the term "standardized options con-
22. In quite another important sense, the options contract is recognized as a security. See infra
note 126 (quoting the 1982 amendment to the 1934 Act's definitional section 3(a)(10)).
23. THE OPTIONS CLEARING CORPORATION, CHARACTERISTICS AND RISKS OF STANDARD-
IZED OPTIONS 4 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 OCC PAMPHLET]. This pamphlet may be obtained upon
request from The Options Clearing Corporation, 200 South Wacker Drive, Chicago, IL 60606.
24. 1987 OCC PAMPHLET, supra note 23, at 4-5; Seligman, supra note 5, at 144.
25. Indices measure the values of groups of stocks. 1987 OCC PAMPHLET, supra note 23, at
32. As an example, the composition of "[t]he most popular index, the CBOE Standard & Poor's
(S&P) 100, is based on the value of the one hundred securities in that index." Seligman, supra note
5, at 147. The broad-based (market) index options that are currently available on their respective
exchanges are as follows: CBOE-S & P 100 and S & P 500 Indices; AMEX-Major Market and
Institutional Indices; PHILA-Value Line and National OTC (Over-the-Counter) Indices; PAC-
Financial News Composite Index; NYSE-NYSE Index. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Mar. 25, 1988, at 39.
The enormous popularity of these types of options contracts cannot be overlooked. See, e.g., Selig-
man, supra note 5, at 148 (aggregate volume for broad-based stock indices for the week ending
November 18, 1983, equalled approximately 13% of the total weekly volume of options contracts
traded).
26. See Seligman, supra note 5, at 150 (describing this type of hybrid). Among the narrow-
based index options currently available on their respective exchanges are: AMEX-Computer Tech-
nology and Oil Indices; PHILA-Utilities and Gold/Silver Indices. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Mar. 25,
1988, at 39.
27. See Seligman, supra note 5, at 151-53 (describing this type of hybrid). United States Gov-
ernment Debt Indices that are currently available on the CBOE include United states Treasury Bond
and five-year United States Treasury Note Indices. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Mar. 25, 1988, at 37.
28. See Seligman, supra note 5, at 153-55 (describing this type of hybrid). Foreign Currency
options contracts that are currently available on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange include: Austra-
lian Dollar, Canadian Dollar, West German Mark, Japanese Yen, and Swiss Francs. See, e.g., Wall
St. J., Mar. 25, 1988, at 39.
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tract," truly reflects one major innovation in the modem options market that
has led to its tremendous growth: uniformity among individual contracts'
terms. 29 Within a given listed issue, options contracts now vary only within
established exercise date and strike price terms. For instance, at the open of the
market on March 26, 1988, Pfizer Corporation call options could be purchased
at the strike prices 50, 55, 60, 65, and 70 (dollars). These uniform strike prices
were available for April, May, and June exercise dates.
30
The value of a standardized option contract is established in the market-
place. Although many considerations permeate any theoretical model of valua-
tion, two factors are generally overriding with regard to options contracts: the
value of its underlying interest and the time remaining until its mandatory or
contractual exercise date.31 Again to use Pfizer Corporation as an illustration,
the premium for an April call option contract at a strike price of 50 (an "April
50 call") was 4 5/8.32 Because the premium is on a per share basis and every
contract represents the right to buy 100 shares of the underlying securities, the
value of the April 50 contract equals $462.50 ($4 5/8 times 100).
A comparison of the April 50 and May 50 calls will illustrate the element of
time value. The values of the May 50 and April 50 call contracts on March 25,
1988, were $550 and $462.50, respectively. The monetary difference between the
two contracts represents the extra price that investors are willing to pay for the
additional month in which to exercise their rights and buy the underlying stock.
A comparison of the values of Pfizer's April 50 and April 60 calls will illus-
trate the relationship between the underlying stock and the option. The April 50
call's premium of 4 5/8 approximates the difference between the contract's
strike price (50) and Pfizer's current market value of $54.75.33 On the other
29. The two most important standardized terms are the exercise or strike price and the expira-
tion date. For call options, the strike price is "the price at which the buyer of the option has the
right to purchase the underlying interest"; for put options, it is the "price at which the buyer of the
option has the right to sell the underlying interest." 1987 OCC PAMPHLET, supra note 23, at 5. The
expiration date is the last day upon which the holder can demand the writer's performance. Id. at 6.
Thus, if not exercised before the expiration date, the options contract ceases to exist: the buyer no
longer has any rights, the writer no longer has any obligations, and consequently, the options con-
tract no longer has value. Id.
One important distinction regarding contract terms and their ensuing obligations should be
made here. Unlike all other standardized options contracts, broad-based market index options differ
fundamentally with respect to the writer's obligation to perform, should she be called upon to do so
at the exercise date. No contractual obligation to deliver the underlying securities exists. Instead,
writers are considered to be in strictly cash positions whereby they are obligated to pay in cash "an
amount equal to the difference (expressed in dollars) between the exercise settlement value of the
underlying index on the day the exercise notice is properly tendered to [The Options Clearing Cor-
poration] and the exercise price of the option, multiplied by a specified index 'multiplier.'" Id.
30. See, e.g., Wall St. J., March. 25, 1988, at 40.
31. See, e.g., Seligman, supra note 5, at 144-45; Black & Scholes, The Pricing of Options and
Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637, 641 (1973); Rubenstein, An Economic Evaluation of
Organized Options Markets, 2 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 49, 54-55, 57 (1979). Other factors
include the underlying issue's volatility, current interest rates (primarily bearing upon the value of
debt index options), and the general supply and demand of both the options contract and its underly-
ing issue. 1987 OCC PAMPHLET, supra note 23, at 6.
32. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Mar. 25, 1988, at 40.
33. Id. As the expiration date draws nearer, the element of time value decreases, eventually to
the point of insignificance. Therefore, the value of a given options contract at its expiration date, and
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hand, because the market value of the underlying stock is not close to the April
60 call's strike price, the call option's premium is relatively small and probably
reflects only the minor value attributable to the remaining time before the con-
tract's expiration. 34 Thus, market manipulation of the option contract's under-
lying securities or index can affect the value of the options contract itself.35
B. Overview of the Modern Options Markets
Although a comprehensive survey of the evolution and current state of op-
erations of the options market is beyond the scope of this Comment, 36 an exami-
nation of the basic underpinnings of today's options markets is necessary to
understand the uniqueness of options transactions.
Standardized options contracts of publicly traded companies can be "writ-
ten," 37 and thereby conceived, in either of two forms. First, actual holders of
underlying shares can write options.38 Second, for those who desire a bit of risk
in their lives, phantom holders can also write call options. This latter group, so-
called naked option writers, commit themselves potentially to delivering under-
lying shares that, at the time that the options contract is written, they do not
own.
After the options contract is written, the next step in issuing the options
contract, that is, getting it to the market, involves sending a request to issue the
contract by the options writer's broker to a "Clearing Member,"'3 9 if the broker
himself is not one, who in turn sends it on to The Options Clearing Corporation
(OCC).4° The OCC, acting as an intermediary, then issues and guarantees each
the excess, if any, of the market value of a 100 lot of such contract's underlying securities over such
contract's strike price should be approximately equal.
34. See, e.g., id.
35. Indeed, due to the relatively short exercise period inherent in the standardized options con-
tract, the potential for financial devastation of an optionholder's position looms far greater than the
corresponding risks that the holder of the underlying securities may confront. In the previous Pfizer
Corporation example, if an investor purchases the April 50 call for $462.50 plus commissions at the
opening of the market on March 26, 1988 and some time before the April expiration date, Pfizer
stock plummets to $40 per share and remains there until after the exercise date, the options trader's
loss would be total (assuming the contract was retained until the expiration date, and not resold).
Conversely, a Pfizer stockholder would incur only partial loss, and more importantly, would still
have the potential to recover any past loss.
36. For a comprehensive illustration of the modem options markets' dynamics, see Seligman,
supra note 5, at 144-47 & 171-78; Johnson, Is It Better to Go Naked on the Street? A Primer on the
Options Market, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 7, 10-13 (1979-80). For a descriptive analysis of the over-
the-counter options market that preceded the CBOE, see Johnson, supra, at 9-10.
37. The "writer" is the one who sells the options contract and thereby obligates himself to
perform, if selected, according to the contract's terms. 1987 OCC PAMPHLET, supra note 23, at 5.
The Options Clearing Corporation (OCC) exclusively establishes who will be called on to perform or
deliver under the contract based upon a random selection process. The ultimate number called will
depend upon how many optionholders wish to exercise their contractual right to buy (or sell, in the
case of a put option). See Seligman, supra note 5, at 146; see also infra note 40 (describing the nature
of the OCC).
38. This type of option is called a covered call. 1987 OCC PHAMPHLET, supra note 23, at 7.
39. Clearing members are those brokerage firms who, pursuant to OCC requirements, are qual-
ified to carry the accounts of options writers or their brokers. 1987 OCC PAMPHLET, supra note 23,
at 70. Clearing members then guarantee the obligations of the options writers to the OCC. Id.
40. The OCC is a clearing agency regulated by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).
1987 OCC PAMPHLET, supra note 23, at 70.
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options contract.4 1 In essence, purchasers buy all options contracts from the
OCC through the exchange that lists the underlying issue for options trading.
Therefore, all purchasers look "to the OCC, and not to an individual writer, for
[the options contract's] performance" because the OCC acts as the primary
guarantor. 42 As a consequence of the OCC's multiple roles coupled with the
standardized options' uniform contract terms, the options market achieves in-
creased market liquidity.
43
The selection of underlying issues that will be listed for options trading is
generally decided by the exchanges without either the issuer's participation or
consent.44 The exception to this general rule surfaces when the underlying issue
is traded on the over-the-counter NASDAQ 45 market. Here, the stock will not
be listed for options trading without the issuer's consent.46 Thus the issuer has
no control over the listing of its issue(s) for options trading in most instances.
The unique features of standardized options contracts and their modem
markets raise several issues with respect to the application of rule lOb-5 claims
of fraudulent options trading. One issue, the topic of this Comment, concerns
standing to bring such claims. Any analysis of standing as it relates to options
traders must include a general discussion of the standing doctrine.
III. THE STANDING DOCTRINE4 7
Courts may utilize standing to preclude a determination of a case's mer-
its.4 8 The standing requirement thus "focuses on the party seeking to get his
complaint before a federal court and not on the issues [or claims] he wishes to
have adjudicated." 49 Two foundations underlie standing requirements. The
"case or controversy" clause in Article III of the Constitution50 requires courts
41. Seligman, supra note 5, at 145.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 146; Johnson, supra note 36, at 24-25; see also Hayes & Tennenbaum, The Impact of
Listed Options on the Underlying Shares, 8 FIN. MGMT. 72, 76 (1979) (describing increased liquidity
in the options contract's underlying securities).
44. 1987 OCC PAMPHLET, supra note 23, at 71.
45. NASDAQ is the acronym for the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated
Quotation System.
46. 1987 oCC PAMPHLET, supra note 23, at 71.
47. This Comment will not comprehensively analyze the standing doctrine. For a
comprehensive analysis, see generally 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, S 3531, at 338 (2d ed. 1984); see also id. at 338 n.1 (a comprehensive
listing of commentators who have addressed the standing doctrine).
48. Id. 1 3531, at 338.
49. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968)); see also Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) ("[S]tanding in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff's conten-
tion."); Cowin v. Bresler, 741 F.2d 410, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[The fact that a cause of action
exists does not mean that any person can invoke section 10(b)'s protections.").
50. The applicable section of Article III provides in full:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Consti-
tution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con-
suls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between two or more States;--between a
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to inquire "whether the plaintiff has made out a 'case or controversy' between
himself and the defendant within the meaning of Article III."" t The Supreme
Court has announced and reaffirmed three requirements under Article III for a
plaintiff's standing to sue in federal courts: 1) injury in fact; 2) fair traceability;
and, 3) redressability. 52 Injury in fact constitutes some personally sustained in-
jury that in general must be more than merely abstract. 53 Traceability relates to
a requisite "fair" nexus between defendant's conduct and plaintiff's injury in
fact. 54 Redressability pertains to the power of the court to satisfy, "by a
favorable decision," plaintiff's injury.55
In addition to Article III's minimums, courts have also identified and uti-
lized prudential considerations or limitations in formulating standing require-
ments. First, "the plaintiff's complaint [must] fall within the zone of interests to
be protected or regulated by the statute ... in question."' 56 Second, courts will
not adjudicate" 'abstract questions of wide public significance' which amount to
'generalized grievances.' -57 Finally, "plaintiff generally must assert his own
legal interests," not merely those of others. 58 These types of considerations are
founded on the courts' reluctance to decide abstract questions that involve wide
public significance, because other governmental institutions are more competent
to address such questions.
59
In two major respects, prudential limitations and Article III requirements
differ. Article III requirements are mandatory; prudential concerns are discre-
tionary.60 But Congress can legislatively grant standing and "courts lack au-
thority to create prudential barriers to standing in suits brought under a statute
in which Congress has done [so]. ' '61
At the time of the Blue Chip Stamps decision in 1975, the prevailing test for
standing utilized two of the six current standing requirements: injury in fact and
zone of interests. 62 Blue Chip Stamps can be viewed as addressing both require-
ments. In examining the Birnbaum doctrine in light of the express language of
State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
51. Warth, 422 U.S. at 498.
52. Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 472.
53. Id. at 472 (citing Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979),
"' '[Plaintiff] personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively
illegal conduct of the defendant .... ' ").
54. Id. (quoting Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 (1976), "the
injury 'fairly can be traced to the challenged action' ").
55. Id. (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 41, "[the injury] 'is likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision.' ").
56. Id. at 475 (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970)).
57. Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 470, 499-500 (1975)).
58. Id. at 474 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 499).
59. See, e.g., Warth, 422 U.S. at 500.
60. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 74 (4th ed. 1983).
61. Id.
62. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970)
(utilizing two-part test involving "injury in fact" and "zone of interest[s]"); see also Herpich v. Wal-
1130 [Vol. 67
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the 1934 Act, the Blue Chip Stamps court initially concluded that the Act did
not offer redress to a plaintiff who does not actually purchase or sell securities
and sustains only noneconomic injury.63 The Court's analysis thus incorporates
the injury in fact requirement, and under such requirement a plaintiff's injury is
easily quantified.
Blue Chip Stamps also addressed the "zone of interest" concern. 64 The
Court, already fearful of the potentially rampant expansion of rule lOb-5 private
actions, 65 utilized policy concerns 6 6 and an absence of legislative intent 67 to con-
clude that investors who were not actual purchasers or sellers did not fall within
the class of those who rule lOb-5 sought to protect-those defrauded "in connec-
tion with" the purchase or sale of securities.
68
As previously stated, the doctrine of standing appears to have evolved into
a term of art in rule lOb-5 options cases because the analyses of the standing
issue and the federal cause of action in many of the decisions have been merged.
Having discussed the doctrine of standing, the focus of this Comment now shifts
to the rule lOb-5 cause of action.
IV. THE MODERN PERSPECTIVE UNDER SECTION 10(b)'s
REGULATORY SCHEME
A. Private Causes of Action in General
In 1946, twelve years after the 1934 Act's promulgation, the implied private
cause of action under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 was first recognized in Kar-
don v. National Gypsum Co. 69 Hence, an era of expanding the cause of action
under rule lOb-5 had begun. Over twenty years later, the Supreme Court offi-
cially affirmed the implied cause of action.70 Concommitant with the expanding
scope of the rule 1Ob-5, however, was a judicial perception that the floodgates of
litigation had also been opened.
In 1952 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Birn-
baum v. Newport Steel Co. foresaw section 10(b)'s implied cause of action under
rule lOb-5, 71 an action Justice Rehnquist would later call "a judicial oak which
lace, 430 F.2d 792, 805 (5th Cir. 1970) (citing the same two-part test in an action under section
10(b)).
63. "In contrast, a putative plaintiff, who neither purchases nor sells securities but sues instead
for intangible economic injury... is more likely to be seeking a largely conjectural and speculative
recovery ... [that] will depend on the plaintiff's subjective hypothesis." Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S.
at 734-35.
64. See Froelich & Spiegel, Standing of Federal Securities Plaintiffs-Which Way the Trend, 24
DE PAUL L. REV. 510, 515 (addressing the discussion of the standing requirement in the Birnbaum
decision); cf. Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 1973) (Birn-
baum's purchaser/seller requirement is a "jurisdictional question").
65. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737, 748-49.
66. Id. at 737-49.
67. See infra note 280 and accompanying text.
68. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C § 78j(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
69. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
70. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
71. 193 F.2d 461, 463-64 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
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has grown from little more than a legislative acorn." 72 Birnbaum limited the
breadth of the private action under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 by holding that
a plaintiff must be either an actual purchaser or seller of securities in order to
have standing to sue.7 3 Twenty years later the Supreme Court sanctified this
holding in Blue Chip Stamps.74 One year after Blue Chip Stamps, the Court in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder75 analogized section 10(b)'s underpinnings to com-
mon-law fraud and held that scienter, not negligence, was the requisite standard
of conduct under rule lOb-5. 76 One year after Hochfelder, in Santa Fe Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Green,77 the Court held that actionable rule 10b-5 conduct must
exhibit manipulation or deception. In 1980 the Court added its latest hurdle to
rule lOb-5's private cause of action in Chiarella v. United States.78 In nondisclo-
sure insider trading actions under rule lOb-5, defendant must have derived the
informational advantage upon which his trading was based from a position of
"trust and confidence." 79 In other words, defendant by virtue of such a relation-
ship must have owed the allegedly defrauded plaintiff a duty to disclose the priv-
ileged information before trading on it for his personal benefit. This series of
cases thus strongly suggests that the Supreme Court is consciously narrowing
the availability of rule lOb-5's private cause of action.80
B. Elements of the Modern Rule 10b-5 Cause of Action
The modern rule lOb-5 action involves multiple requirements, and depend-
ing upon which case is read, the phraseologies frequently differ. To generalize,
liability under rule lOb-5 requires fraud, scienter, materiality, reliance, causa-
tion, and injury. Analogous to the common law, fraud under rule lOb-5 can
take the form of either nondisclosure or affirmative misrepresentation, but the
alleged conduct must exhibit either manipulative or deceptive attributes.
8 ' Sci-
enter is the requisite culpability standard. 82 Materiality is whether a "substan-
tial likelihood" exists "that the disclosure of the omitted [or misrepresented fact]
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly al-
tered the total mix of information made available." 8 3 Although requiring no
72. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737 (1975).
73. Birnbaum, 98 F. Supp. 506, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
74. 421 U.S. at 737.
75. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
76. Id. at 212-14, see also supra note 10 (illustrating section 10(b) and rule 10b-5).
77. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
78. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
79. Id. at 230; see infra notes 128-200 and accompanying text (discussing the requisite
relationship).
80. Brooks, supra note 20, at 431.
81. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
82. Scienter is "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12; see also id. at 199 (section 10(b)'s terms "manipulative," "de-
vice," and "contrivance... connote intentional or willful conduct designed to defraud investors.").
83. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 983 (1988) (quoting with approval TSC Indus., Inc.
v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
1132 [Vol. 67
OPTION TRADERS AND RULE 10b-5
less than all the elements, the options cases under rule lOb-5 primarily involve
reliance, causation, and injury.
Reliance "is a corollary of materiality" 4 that "provides the requisite causal
connection between a defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiff's injury."5
85
Plaintiff's reliance also must have been reasonable. 86 When nondisclosure is
involved, proving reliance may border on the impossible.8 7 Therefore, some
courts rely on a fraud-on-the-market theory under which reliance will be satis-
fied "by a showing that the market price was affected by the misstatement or
omission and plaintiff's injury is due to a purchase or sale at the then fraudu-
lently induced market price." s88 The Supreme Court has previously held that
reliance may be presumed in face-to-face transactions. 89 Recently, however, the
Court announced in Basic Inc. v. Levinson 90 that "[ilt is not inappropriate to
apply a presumption of reliance supported by the fraud-on-the-market theory"
for open market or faceless transactions. 91
Causation has two components: transactional and loss causation.92 Trans-
actional causation constitutes inducement; that is, "but for the wrongful con-
duct, the transaction would not" have been consummated. 93 Because of its
similarity to reliance, transactional causation "may be subsumed in the reliance
finding."'94 Loss causation addresses the question whether, but for the wrongful
conduct, plaintiff's actual economic injury would not have occurred. 95
Although reliance and causation are closely related, Basic did not go so far as to
dispense with a plaintiff's showing of causation.
96
Finally, some type of injury must have resulted from defendant's conduct.
Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act limits recovery to actual damages, 97 and proving
84. T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 463 (2d ed. 1985).
85. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 989.
86. See ag., id.
87. See Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement,
70 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 36-37 (1982); see also infra notes 177-95 and accompanying text (discussing
this issue more comprehensively).
88. T. HAZEN, supra note 84, at 465. See generally Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of
Dispensing with Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C.L. REv. 436
(1984) (thoroughly examining the fraud-on-the-market theory).
For some decisions that have entertained a fraud-on-the-market theory and accepted it in sup-
port for a presumption of reliance, see Piel v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154 (3d Cir. 1986); Lipton v.
Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985); Ross v. A. H. Robins
Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); see also infra notes 227-44 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the application of the fraud-on-the-market theory to an options trader's rule lOb-5 action).
89. See infra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
90. 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988).
91. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 989-93.
92. Loss causation is also called causation in fact.
93. T. HAZEN, supra note 84, at 467.
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 993 (White & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
97. The applicable language of section 28(a) states, "[N]o person permitted to maintain a suit
for damages under the provisions of this chapter shall recover ... a total amount in excess of his
actual damages on account of the act complained of." 15 U.S.C. §-78bb(a) (1982).
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them may be no small feat.98
C. The Options Cases Prior to 1980
The history of cases that address rule lOb-5 actions in an options contract
context exemplify the courts' struggle with the interaction between the 1934
Act's definitional provisions and the Birnbaum doctrine. Although numbering
few before 1980, these cases nonetheless illustrate issues with which courts con-
tinue to grapple today.
The Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff99 cases are the earliest reported cases in which
plaintiff based his rule lOb-5 action on an option contract. Globus I and Globus
I1 involved a shareholders' derivative suit for money damages upon a nondisclo-
sure theory that was brought against, among others, a corporation board of di-
rectors. Plaintiffs alleged that the directors had obtained shareholder approval
of a resolution that granted a restricted stock option by means of a misleading
proxy statement. t1 ° Of most importance in Globus II was the court's statement
that an options contract was within the definition of a "security" under the lan-
guage of section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act.10'
Defendant initially attacked the complaint on two grounds: lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and failure to state a cause of action.10 2 In addressing only
the latter,'0 3 the Globus I court rejected defendant's contention that the Birn-
baum doctrine precluded the action because the corporation did not purchase or
98. See generally T. HAZEN, supra note 84, at 470-75 (comprehensively illustrating the issues
that arise with proof of damages). The options cases present unique applications of the damages
requirement. Not only are options now expressly defined as "securities" under the 1934 Act, see
infra note 126 (quoting § 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982), as amended), but
they also represent rights to purchase their underlying securities. Moreover, pursuant to Blue Chip
Stamps the purchase of a stock option constitutes the purchase of its underlying securities for pur-
poses of the purchaser/seller requirement. Therefore an investor who purchases options is also
deemed to have purchased its underlying securities. This rationale taken to its logical conclusion
results in a somewhat anamolous situation: the investor has two distinct potential sources of dam-
ages from purchasing only options-the options themselves and their underlying securities-but is
monetarily at risk only with respect to her investment in the options. To allow such an investor to
recover for damage with respect to the underlying securities violates section 28(a)'s mandate that
recovery under the 1934 Act is limited to only "actual" damages incurred; see supra note 97 and
accompanying text (discussing § 28(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982)).
99. 271 F. Supp. 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (addressing plaintiff's subsequent motion for summary
judgment) [hereinafter Globus 11]; Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 266 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (address-
ing defendant's motions to dismiss the complaint) [hereinafter Globus 1].
100. See Globus I, 266 F. Supp. at 379. The option agreement gave a Techmation executive the
option to buy 10,000 shares per year for 10 consecutive years. Id. The alleged material nondisclo-
sures included, inter alia, the option price, "which on the date of the 'Notice of Special Meeting' [of
the] shareholders was 60%" of the OTC ask price. Id. at 380.
101. Id. at 380. The court's finding was a liberal interpretation of section 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C
§ 78c (a)(10) (1982) because at the time that section did not expressly include options in its definition
of "securities." See infra note 126 (quoting the current version of § 3(a)(10) after the 1982
amendments).
102. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) & (6).
103. The court addressed only the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) defense because "if a
claim is stated, then the court has jurisdiction over it, and may not dismiss on either ground."
Globus 1, 266 F. Supp. at 527. The quotation provides a prime example of how the standing require-
ment as explicated in Birnbaum has been confused theoretically with cause of action. The standing
requirement should focus on the plaintiff, not the merits of the case. See supra note 49 and accompa-
nying text.
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sell securities.'°4 The facts of both decisions failed to disclose whether any stock
was actually issued pursuant to the option. But by negative implication, the
Board's grant and subsequent approval of the option alone appears to underlie
the court's determination that the corporation was a seller of securities and
plaintiffs had derivative standing to sue.
Another 1975 decision, Wulc v. Great & Western Industries, Inc.,10 5 based
its conclusion that an option agreement was a security under the 1934 Act upon
language in Blue Chip Stamps.10 6 In Wuic, plaintiff was an employee of a corpo-
ration that was the target of a takeover from whom he had been granted stock
options. Pursuant to the terms of the merger agreement between the bidding
corporation and his employer, the bidding corporation assumed liability for
plaintiff's option. After the merger, the bidding corporation failed to fulfill that
obligation when plaintiff subsequently sought to exercise his options. Plaintiff
then brought an action under rule lOb-5. Defendants moved to dismiss 0 7 pur-
suant to the Birnbaum doctrine on the grounds that plaintiff never actually
owned any stock in either corporation. The court upheld plaintiff's standing by
initially stating that "[a]n option is a contract, and comes within the definition of
a 'security' under the statutes."10 8 Next, in efforts to satisfy the requisite pur-
chaser/seller requirement, the court utilized a forced seller theory to allow
plaintiff standing. 109
A year later the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York faced a similar case in 601 West 26 Corp. v. Solitron Devices, Inc. 110
There, the writer of call options requested injunctive relief to prohibit Solitron
Devices, Inc. from publicly disseminating favorable earnings reports. Plaintiffs
104. See Globus 1, 266 F. Supp. at 528.
105. [1975-76 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,361, at 98,786 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
106. The pertinent language in Blue Chip Stamps provides:
A contract to purchase or sell securities is expressly defined by § 3(a) of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a), as a purchase or sale of securities for the purposes of that Act. Unlike
respondent,.., the holder of puts, calls, options and other contractual rights or duties to
purchase or sell securities have been recognized as "purchasers" or "sellers" of securities
for purposes of Rule 10b-5, not because of a judicial conclusion that they were similarly
situated .... but because the definitional provisions of the 1934 Act themselves grant them
such a status.
421 U.S. 723, 750-51 (1975) (footnote omitted). The statutes cited by the Court provide: "The
terms "buy" and "purchase" each include any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire," 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1970), "[tlhe terms 'sale' and 'sell' each include any contract to sell of otherwise
dispose of." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1970).
107. Defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), (5), (6)
and (7). The court summarized, "Basically defendants contend that the complaint fails to allege any
civil cause of action under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ...." [1975-76 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 98,787. Interestingly, the court interpreted Blue Chip Stamps to require
"a plaintiff to be either a purchaser or seller of a security, in order to state a cause ofaction under
Section 10(b)." Id. (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 98,788 (citing § 3(a)(13) of the 1934 Act).
109. The Wulc court was unclear as to exactly how the forced seller theory applied to plaintiff's
particular situation. See id. at 98,788. The theory, however, is commonly applied to allow plaintiffs
standing under rule lOb-5 when stockholders are effectively forced to sell out of their investments by
defendant's use of fraudulent means. The classic scenario is the "freeze out." See generally T. HA-
ZEN, supra note 84, at 453-54 (discussing forced seller doctrine). For a discussion of the forced seller
doctrine as it relates to standing and options traders, see infra notes 268-77 and accompanying text.
110. 291 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 420 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1969).
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alleged that defendants "failed to follow generally accepted accounting proce-
dures in their audit."'' Accordingly, "the resulting [financial] reports
presented an unduly favorable earnings picture, [and] as a consequence... Soli-
tron stock rose in price" during the period in which plaintiff had written calls on
the stock. 1 2 The optionholders subsequently called for delivery of over half of
the underlying shares; plaintiff then borrowed shares and delivered them. The
court sustained defendants' contention that plaintiff lacked standing. It appar-
ently reasoned that because the shares were delivered pursuant to and in accord-
ance with a pre-existing contractual obligation, no sale of securities had
occurred. Hence, plaintiff had no standing.' 1 3
A final pre-1980 decision representative of one of the "modern" (post-1980)
views' 14 is Lloyd v. Industrial Bio-Test Laboratories, Inc. 115 In a class action,
plaintiffs brought section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 actions for money damages
against defendants based upon call options that plaintiffs had purchased "in reli-
ance on the integrity of the market and on information released," that concerned
a new drug produced and marketed by defendants. 1 6 In their misrepresenta-
tion action, plaintiffs alleged that information contained in the Syntex Corpora-
tion's annual report and subsequent public announcements and press releases
"painted a rosy picture of imminent approval" from the Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA), but they "did not reveal that the test results submitted to the
FDA ... concealed irregularities."' '17 When the irregularities were eventually
disclosed, the FDA gave notice of its possible withdrawal of the drug's market-
ing approval. As a result, Syntex stock plummeted, as did the value of plaintiffs'
call options.
Defendants contended "that the complaint [was] insufficient because it [did]
not allege any fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security."'11 8
The court ruled that plaintiffs had standing. 1 9 First, the court stated that op-
tions contracts were themselves securities under section 3(a)(10) of the 1934
Act.120 Second, the court rejected defendants' additional argument for dismissal
111. Id. at 883.
112. Id. at 885-86.
113. The court's analysis is sufficiently interesting to warrant quoting:
The 1934 Act defines the term "sale" and "sell" to include "any contract to sell or other-
wise dispose of." If a writer of a call option "otherwise disposes" of securities which he
does not own, then apparently plaintiff has standing. However, if a writer of a call option
does not "dispose" of a security because he does not own it, then, despite plaintiff's consid-
erable pecuniary interest in Solitron, plaintiff may not seek relief from a violation of the
Act.
Id. at 886 (citation omitted) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1964)) (emphasis added). The fact that
the shares were borrowed was irrelevant.
114. See cases cited infra note 229 for other modem views.
115. 454 F. Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Other defendants included "Syntex Corporation, and
one of its subsidiaries (collectively 'Syntex'), certain of the officers and directors of Syntex and Indus-
trial Bio-Test Laboratories, Inc." Id. at 809.
116. Id. at 810.
117. Id. at 810.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 810-11.
120. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1964)).
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that "the options [that plaintiffs had] purchased and sold were not issued by
defendants but by an entity unrelated to them." 12 1 The court held that privity
0f contract was not required under section 10(b) or rule lOb-5.1
22
The above cases developed two significant principles. Some cases expressly
held that an option contract was a "security" per se under section 3(a)(10).1
2 3
In other cases, the prevailing view emerged that an options contract falls under
the purview of sections 3(a)(13) and (14) and constitutes a purchase or sale of
the underlying securities. And while Wulc went so far as to say that Blue Chip
Stamps brought the options contract under section 3(a)(10)'s definitional am-
bit, 124 this is simply not so. Blue Chip Stamps addressed only the issue of a
foregone purchase of common stock; the issue of whether the options contract
constituted a security was not involved.1
25
Regardless of whether Wulc, or Solitron, or possibly even the Globus cases
assumed that an options contract was in fact a security under the 1934 Act in
their eagerness to address the purchaser/seller requirement, Congress laid all
potential squabbling on this issue to rest in 1982 by amending section 3(a)(10).
The definition of a "security" under the 1934 Act now expressly includes puts
and calls. 126
V. CHIARELLA V UNITED STATES AND MODERN OPTIONS CASES
UNDER SEcrION 10(b)
Before Chiarella was decided in 1980, rule lOb-5 decisions in general strug-
gled over the questions whether a defendant was under a duty to disclose or
abstain, 127 and if so, to whom the duty was owed. One general rule appears to
121. Id. at 811. Defendants' argument here reflects the modem options market phenomenon:
the creator of a standardized options contract could be virtually anyone. See supra notes 37-46 and
accompanying text (explaining how standardized options contracts are created).
122. Lloyd, 454 F. Supp. at 811.
123. E.g., id. at 810-11; see also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Corp., 401 F.2d 833, 852, 856-57 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en bane) (upholding SEC's rule lOb-5 actions for insider trading against the recipients of
employee stock options), cerL denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); Lubin v. Belco Petroleum Corp., [1978
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), 96,543, at 94,237 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (involving rule lOb-5
action based on put option or option to sell a limited partnership interest).
Although language in Globus I, Globus I and Solitron may support the argument that options
contracts were in fact securities under the 1934 Act is unclear, section 3(a)(10) did contain language
at the time of these decisions that certainly added support to such a conclusion: a "right to subscribe
to or purchase, any of the foregoing [previously enumerated instruments which included common
stock]; and "in general, any instrument commonly known as a 'security.'" 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)
(1976).
124. Wulc, [1975-76 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 98,787-88.
125. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 725-28.
126. Section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act reads in part:
The term "security means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, . . . any
put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or
index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof) or any put,
call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to
foreign currency, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a "security" .....
15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(10) (1982).
127. The so-called "abstain or disclose" rule requires that before trading, those under its ambit
must disclose nonpublic information accessed by virtue of their position with the issuer or "abstain
from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while inside information remains undis-
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have finally emerged: "When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclo-
sure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak."1 28 In Chiarella, the
Supreme Court stated that "the duty to disclose arises when one party has infor-
mation 'that the other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or simi-
lar relation of trust and confidence between them.' ",129 Relationships of trust
and confidence were stated to be "specific relationship[s] between parties."1 30 In
theory, particular relationships that generally give rise to duties include fiducia-
ries and beneficiaries,' 3 1 agents and principals, 132 and most importantly, corpo-
rate insiders133 and shareholders.' 34 The corporate insider holds a fiduciary
relationship with his corporation's shareholders1 35 that encompasses the duty to
disclose.136
The rationale behind the abstain or disclose rule is sound. Intuitively, the
duty is based on fairness. From a practical standpoint, it seeks to protect inves-
tors from insiders' obvious informational advantages.' 37 The duty effectuates
section 10(b)'s underlying purpose "to protect the investing public and to secure
closed." Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848; see also In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907,
911 (1961) (espousing similar rule).
128. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980). Chiarella involved an insider-trading
criminal action based on section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Defendant was an employee of a financial
printer who deduced names of takeover targets from documents prepared pursuant to requests from
his employer's clients. He eventually purchased and sold stock of the targets without first disclosing
the information. The Court held "that a duty to disclose.., does not arise from the mere possession
of nonpublic market information." Id. at 235. His conviction consequently was overturned.
129. Id. at 228 (RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 851(2)(a) (1981)); see also Dirks v.
S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 657-58 (reaffirming this statement in Chiarella).
130. 445 U.S. at 233.
131. Id. at 359.
132. Id. at 233.
133. Traditional insiders include officers, directors, and controlling shareholders. See, e.g., In re
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 911; Langevoort, supra note 87, at 20. For purposes of this
Comment, the term "insider" will not include corporations who issue the option contract's underly-
ing interest (the "underlying issuer").
In Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983), the Supreme Court announced that corporate insiders'
abstain or disclose duty, owed to shareholders, can be derivatively extended to their tippees on the
basis that the information has been improperly passed to them. Id. at 659-60. Initially, the insider's
tip must be of such a magnitude to have otherwise constituted a breach of the fiduciary duty owed to
the shareholders. Id. at 661-63. Additionally, the tippee must know or be chargeable with knowl-
edge that the disclosure made to him was such a breach. Id. If the two conditions above are satis-
fied, a tippee can be held liable under rule lOb-5 for illegal insider trading. Accord Lloyd v.
Industrial Bio-Test Laboratories, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); O'Connor & Assocs. v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on reh'g, 600 F. Supp. 702
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
134. Chiarella, 445 at U.S. 228. This list should not be viewed as exclusive; other types of "prior
dealings" between the parties may suffice. See id. at 232.
135. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654 (citing Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227-35); see also Chiarella 445 U.S. at
228 n.8 (quoting Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.) (Hand, L., J.), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
920 (1951)) (stating the same rule); id. at 228-29 (discussing In re Cady, Roberts & Co.); Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939) (stating a similar rule).
136. Strong v. Reptide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909); accord Bianco v. Texas Instruments, 627 F. Supp.
154 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (involving options trading); O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
529 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (involving options trading), aff'd on reh'g, 600 F. Supp. 702
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
137. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 912 n.15; see also Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228-29
(quoting Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 809 (D. Del. 1951)); Laventhal v. General
Dynamics Corp., 704 F.2d 407, 412 (8th Cir.) (options traders' rule lOb-5 action), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 846 (1983).
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fair dealing in the securities markets.., so that [a fully] informed judgement can
be made by all investors who trade in such markets.
13 8
A. The Nondisclosure Cases
The post-Chiarella options cases that involve actions for nondisclosure con-
tinue to struggle over the duty issue. These cases have developed two distinct
lines of thinking with respect to whom the requisite duty is owed, 13 9 although
one line seems to be emerging as the dominant view.140 In one line, O'Connor &
Associates v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 141 is the seminal case for the proposi-
tion that an actionable rule lOb-5 violation requires only that the defendant
breach some duty owed to someone; others may then bring a proper civil action
so long as they can establish the other rule lOb-5 elements.1 42 The O'Connor
decision refused to follow Chiarella and distinguished its holding on the civil
standing issue by noting that Chiarella involved a criminal action while
O'Conner involved a civil action.143 The O'Connor court expressly stated that
the fiduciary duty owed by corporate insiders to shareholders did not extend to
options traders 144 because the optionholders lacked an equity interest in the cor-
poration.1 45 Yet the court went on to state that "by virtue of their fiduciary
duty to the corporation and its shareholders, corporate insiders become subject
138. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 235 (2d Cir. 1974).
139. The split occurs when defendants are individuals who face insider trading allegations under
section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5. Otherwise, the cases appear to be generally in accord with respect to
nondisclosure actions against the corporation that issues the options contract's underlying securities
(the "underlying issuer"). But see Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 540 F. Supp. 667 (D. Mass. 1982)
(upholding an action against nonprofit foundations controlled by individual defendants). Therefore,
this Comment will primarily focus on alleged insider trading violations against individuals.
140. See cases cited infra note 153.
141. 529 F. Supp 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd on reh'g, 600 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (re-
hearing based upon Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1025 (1984)); accord Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 540 F. Supp. 667 (D. Mass. 1982).
O'Connor represents the first reported post-Chiarella rule lOb-5 action in an options contract
context. It involved defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) "because [the complaint did] not allege a fiduciary relationship between themselves and
O'Connor." O'Connor, 529 F. Supp at 1183. The facts show that Amax, Inc. publicly announced a
takeover proposal submitted by Standard Oil of California, Inc. (Socal) conditioned upon approval
by Amax. Amax immediately rejected the bid. Plaintiff O'Connor & Associates (O'Connor) was an
options trader. It sold Amax calls as the stock's price skyrocketed following the offer and rejection.
O'Connor alleged that unknown insiders employed by defendants Amax or Socal tipped unknown
customers and registered representatives of the brokerage houses of Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. and
A. G. Becker, Inc., who in turn purchased call options during the period in which O'Connor wrote
the calls. Defendants who moved for dismissal included the alleged tippees-Dean Witter, A.G.
Becker, their employees and customers-and Amax; Socal did not join in the motion. See id. at
1182-83. Only Amax's motion was granted. Id. at 1194.
142. O'Connor, 529 F. Supp. at 1185-86; see also Starkman v. Warner Communications, 671 F.
Supp. 297, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (similarly interpreting O'Connor).
143. O'Connor, 529 F. Supp. at 1185. Ironically, the court alternatively relied upon United
States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983), another criminal
rule lOb-5 action.
144. O'Connor, 529 F. Supp. at 1185; accord cases cited infra note 153.
145. O'Connor, 529 F. Supp. at 1184-85. But see infra notes 154-59 and accompanying text
(illustrating that some optionholders maintain concurrent equity positions and therefore are owed
fiduciary duties).
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to the separate duty to either 'abstain or disclose' ",146 and owed this duty "'to
the [entire] investing public.' "147 In O'Connor, the investing public included
options traders. 148
The second line of cases strictly adhere to Chiarella, which requires a strin-
gent relationship of trust and confidence between the parties. 14 9 The leading
case in this line is Laventhal v. General Dynamics Corp. 15 Laventhal involved an
options trader's private rule lOb-5 action against the underlying issuer and indi-
vidual corporate insiders. The Laventhal court expressly "disapproved" of two
prior cases that upheld an optionholder's nondisclosure action against corporate
insiders.1 51 Thus, other than those cases where the insider contemporaneously
trades with the options trader, 152 the decisions that follow Laventhal refuse to
find that underlying issuers or individual insiders owe a duty to abstain or dis-
close to the investing public, including options traders.
Cases in the Laventhal line153 rest their holdings on an optionholder's lack
146. Id. at 1187.
147. Id. (citing Shapiro, 495 F.2d at 240) (emphasis added); accord Bianco v. Texas Instruments,
627 F. Supp. 154, 163 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (upholding options traders' lOb-5 action against corporate
insiders "[b]ecause the securities laws are designed to protect the entire open market.... ."). But see
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231 (in disapproving jury instruction, the court stated, "In effect, the trial
court instructed the jury that petitioner owed a duty to everyone; to all sellers, indeed, to the market
as a whole.").
148. Although O'Connor spoke of corporate insiders' duties in broad terms, the decision also
specifically addressed whether tippees-those with whom the corporate insiders have shared their
information-were under the duty to abstain or disclose. The court eventually held such a duty was
derivatively imposed from their insider-tippers. Id. at 1187; accord Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654
(1983) (citing Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227-35); see also Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231 n.12 (recognizing
that Shapiro had upheld tippees' liability). Contra Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d at 13-14,
15-16 (flatly rejecting any extension of a derivative duty owed to shareholders other than those of the
tipper's corporation), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1025 (1989). Thus under O'Connor, both corporate
insiders and their tippees fall under the abstain or disclose requirement; but the underlying issuer
owes no duty.
In one respect O'Connor misconstrues Chiarella's explication of the duty requirement. In gen-
eral, post-Chiarella decisions that have addressed civil nondisclosure actions under rule lb-5 almost
invariably hold that there must be more than just a "duty in the air." Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc.,
553 F. Supp. 1347, 1353 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1025
(1984).
149. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
150. 704 F.2d 407 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983). See generally Note, Laventhal v.
General Dynamics Corporation: No Recovery fo the Plaintiff-Option Holder in a Case of Insider
Trading Under Rule 10b-5, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 780 (1984) (disscussing Laventhal and arguing plain-
tiff option holder should not have standing to sue).
151. Laventhal, 704 F.2d at 413 n.5 (disapproving In re McDonald Douglas Corp. Secs. Litig.,
[1981-82 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,737 (E.D. Mo. 1982) and Backman v.
Polaroid Corp., 540 F. Supp. 667 (D. Mass. 1982)). After Laventhal the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri reversed itself. See In re McDonald Douglas, 567 F. Supp.
126, 127-28 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
152. See, eg., Bianco v. Texas Instruments., 627 F. Supp. 154, 163-64 (N.D. Il1. 1985).
153. The following nondisclosure options-related cases collectively constitute the Laventhal line:
Laventhal v. General Dymanics Corp., 704 F.2d 407 (8th Cir. 1983) (neither the underlying issuer or
its insiders owed a duty to abstain or disclose to options traders), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983);
Starkman v. Warner Communications, 671 F. Supp. 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (same); Bianco v. Texas
Instruments, 627 F. Supp. 154 (N.D. Il. 1985) (only underlying issuers owed no abstain or disclose
duty to options traders; insiders who contemporaneously traded in options owed the duty); In re
McDonald Douglas, 567 F. Supp. 126 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (neither the underlying issuer or its insiders
owed a duty to abstain or disclose to options traders). Bianco and Starkman permitted affirmative
misrepresentation under rule lOb-5. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
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of an equity interest.1 54 Although courts have had occasion, 155 none to date has
distinguished between covered-call writers,15 6 naked-option writers, and mere
optionholders for purposes of analyzing the abstain or disclose duty. Along a
continuum beginning with investors who only own stock and ending with those
who only trade the stock's option and do not own the underlying stock (for
example, mere optionholders), covered-call writers fall somewhere in the mid-
dle-they are both stockholders and optionholders. A corresponding continuum
with respect to duties owed to these varieties of options traders, however, does
not exist. By virtue of their equity interest, stockholders have a fiduciary duty
that circumscribes the lesser duty to abstain or disclose.1 5 7 Yet with stockhold-
ers, all duties arbitrarily end.
Refusing to extend the duty to abstain or disclose to options traders who
maintain concurrent holdings of the underlying stock seems illogical, at the very
least.1 5 8 Such a shareholder is no less a shareholder because she has chosen to
create a derivative security. Her pre-writing equity position has not changed,
and therefore any pre-existing fiduciary relationships should theoretically re-
main unaffected.15 9 Turning now to actions brought by options traders who do
not concurrently own equity interests, several sound policy arguments have been
advanced in support of not subjecting corporate defendants to a duty to abstain
or disclose owing to such a class of options traders.
The Laventhal line appears to be incessantly mindful that an underlying
issuer's "potential liability to options holders is limited only by the whims of the
options writers." 160 If underlying issuers were allowed to be sued, the innocent
shareholders would certainly be the ones to suffer.1 61 Given an insider's level of
control over the underlying issuer, contribution from those individuals who were
actually culpable might be impractical absent a derivative suit.1 62 Second, a
corporation has no effective control over the number of options contracts that
154. See Laventhal, 704 F.2d at 411-13; Starkman, 671 F. Supp. at 304-06; Bianco, 627 F. Supp.
at 159-61; In re McDonald Douglas, 567 F. Supp. at 127.
155. See, eg., Starkman, 671 F. Supp. at 300 (plaintiff was a stockholder who sold covered
calls); Weintraub v. Texasgulf, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1466 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (plaintiff was holder of both
options and stock).
156. Covered call writers are those who either write or purchase options while concurrently
maintaining an equity position in the options contract's underlying securities. See supra note 38 and
accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
158. Cf. Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.) (a corporate director's fiduciary duty
extends to incipient as well as pre-existing shareholders), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951).
159. See Langevoort, supra note 87, at 42. Chiarella suggests shareholder status alone may suf-
fice to meet the "prior dealings" threshold. 445 U.S. at 232-35. At this point an additional question
can be raised: Does a former shareholder's prior dealings suffice if she now trades only in the options
contracts?
160. Bianco, 627 F. Supp. at 161.
161. See, eg., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988) (White & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting)
(quoting Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. de-
nied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)).
162. To frustrate matters further, even if the derivative suit was to prevail, the insider may be
covered by an indemnification agreement with the underlying issuer if he is found to be liable. See T.
HAzEN, supra note 84, at 211-13 (discussing the use of indemnification contracts).
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are written and the resulting pool of potential plaintiffs. 163 Basic ideals of fair-
ness suggest that this virtually unlimited exposure to liability outweighs any ben-
efits to be derived from allowing recovery from a corporation rather than those
individuals who are responsible for the corporation's acts.
Some commentators have espoused economic arguments to support such
options traders' rule lOb-5 actions. 64 One economic theory that has been ad-
vanced states that standardized options contracts reduce risk in the capital mar-
kets through risk diversification and consequently facilitate trading in the
underlying securities.' 65 Because the corporation receives the benefits, the argu-
ment continues, it should also incur the costs as a matter of basic fairness.
t66
This argument fails to realize that option writing shareholders are the only par-
ties who directly avail themselves of any beneficial risk diversification. Any
residual benefits that may inure to the underlying issuer should be viewed as
merely gratuitous because the underlying issuer derives no direct monetary bene-
fit from a standardized option transaction.
167
Some commentators have also advanced the argument that upholding op-
tions traders' rule lOb-5 actions will result in much needed investor confi-
dence.' 68 At first glance this particular policy concern would appear to have
substantial merit, given that one of the broad purposes behind the 1934 Act is to
protect trading on all national securities markets.' 69 This concern, however,
implicitly calls for market certainty, and the nature of the options contract is
inapposite to such a concern. The options contract inheres tremendous risk.
Those unable to handle potentially catastrophic financial losses simply have no
business in the options markets. A section 10(b)-based options insurance that
would directly affect the investments of hundreds, thousands, or perhaps mil-
lions of innocent shareholders is a matter of broad social policy better left to
Congress than the Judiciary Branch.170 The culpable individuals, not the under-
lying issuers, are the proper pocketbooks from which to rectify wrongs.
The reasons for denying recovery from underlying issuers do not support a
163. The Laventhal line is in accord with this proposition. See cases cited supra note 153.
164. E.g., Note, Private Causes ofAction for Option Investors Under SEC Rule 0b-.5: A Policy,
Doctrinal, and Economic Analysis, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1959, 1965 (1987). But see, e.g., Wu, An
Economist Looks at Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 260
(1968) (arguing for allowing insider trading on a purely economic foundation).
165. J. Cox & M. RUBENSTEIN, OPTIONS MARKETS 444 (1985). But see Deutschman v. Benefi-
cial Corp., 841 F.2d at 508 (implying that this proposition is too speculative).
166. See Note, supra note 164, at 1969. But see Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure
and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801, 809 (1980) (stating pure fairness has "little sub-
stance").
Section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 answer the question as to what conduct is unfair. Those who wish
to use fairness to broaden enormously substantive coverage of these provisions seek to substitute
judicial conscience for Congress's manifestation of social conscience. No case has yet raised this
type of prudential standing argument.
167. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text (discussing the origination of a standardized
options contract).
168. See Note, supra note 164, at 1965.
169. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 2, 15 U.S.C. 78b (1982) (setting forth
Congress' reasons for regulating national securities markets).
170. See supra note 57 and accompanying text and infra note 171.
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similar conclusion with regard to fraudulent actions of corporate insiders. If
market integrity and investor confidence is the driving policy consideration, the
proper solution should address the root of the problem. Any lack of public con-
fidence is derived from the well-publicized insider trading cases.' 7 1 As a conse-
quence, the general public perceives that the small investor has virtually no
control over his investments when up against formidable informational
advantages.
Potential liability concerns as set forth above apply equally to corporate
insiders. Here too, courts have recognized the potentially vast horizons of liabil-
ity. In addition, the 1934 Act exacerbates the liability concern by requiring that
plaintiffs sue for actual damages. 172 Ideally Congress should amend the 1934
Act's civil liability provisions in order to establish a single potential pool limited
in amount to the insider's illegal profits. Such a provision would protect against
unreasonable exposure to rule 1Ob-5 liability. 173 But a sufficient system of statu-
tory and judicially evolved checks on insiders' potential exposure to rule lOb-5
liability already exists.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically allow an award of attor-
ney's fees for spurious claims.174 Rule lOb-5 requires that the plaintiff meet the
burden of showing scienter, not negligence. 175 Moreover, plaintiffs must show
that the insider traded deceptively, or, in the case of tipper/tippee liability, that
the tipper gave information pursuant to a personal profit motive. 176 If all the
preceding is not ominous enough, plaintiff may still have to show reliance and
causation. Stringent burdens of proof provide defendants with better chances
for pretrial interception-for example, through summary judgment. All the pre-
ceding mechanisms currently help to assure that defendants will be potentially
subject to liability only in the most worthy cases. Nonetheless courts remain
incensed about defendants' potential rule lOb-5 liability. This Comment will
now shift its discussion back to the duty requirement: the main device that the
courts have created to limit defendants' exposure to rule lOb-5 liability.
As previously stated, Laventhal provides the foundation for the dominant
view with respect to options traders' standing to sue for rule lOb-5 actions in-
171. See, e.g., Newsweek, May 26, 1986, cover page (cover story is entitled "Greed on Wall
Street" and concerns Dennis Levine's illegal trading activities); Time, Dec. 1, 1986, cover page (Ivan
Boesky's picture constitutes the entire cover page and beside it appears the caption: "Investor 'Ivan
the Terrible' Boesky."
172. See supra note 97 (quoting the 1934 Act's section 28(a) in part).
173. See, e.g., Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
In Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 613 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980), which involved a class action,
the Second Circuit prorated an insider's total illegal profits to each member of the class. The Elkind
formula is arguably at odds with a plaintiff's "actual damages" requirement under section 28(a). See
supra note 97 (quoting § 28(a)). But see Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.) (innovatively
fashioning a recovery within § 28(a)'s confines), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
174. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. For a securities case that utilized this device, see Browning Debenture
Holders' Committee v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1977).
175. See supra text accompanying note 76.
176. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 662, 646 (1983) (test for actionable tippees' trading is "whether
the insider [tipper] personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure").
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volving nondisclosure. 177 The Laventhal court based its conclusion that plaintiff
lacked of standing on the "lack of [any] transactional nexus between the defend-
ant's trading and the plaintiff's loss. ' ' 178 As the cases that have followed
Laventhal illustrate, transactional nexus has become dispositive in determining
whether the underlying issuer or its insiders owe a duty to disclose to options
traders.
Rule lOb-5's loss causation requirement theoretically encompasses transac-
tional nexus. Under the Laventhal line, transactional nexus has become inextri-
cably linked to a defendant's duty to disclose. 179 Transactional nexus appears to
have two components: transactional privity and contemporaneous trading.
Transactional privity seeks to avoid the imposition of liability on "those who
possess only a tangential relationship to the transaction."' 180 The Laventhal line
considers the option transaction, either the purchase or sale, to be a third-party
contract because the corporation itself does not issue the option contract.
1 8 1
Therefore, no relationship of trust and confidence between the underlying issuer
and its insiders and the options trader is deemed to exist, and consequently, any
options trader's loss is judged to be too speculative to sustain a cause of
action. '
82
Laventhal followed the interpretation of the requisite causation announced
in Fridrich v. Bradford.183 Fridrich focused exclusively on the insider's ultimate
"act of trading."' 84 In Fridrich the court concluded that plaintiffs lacked causa-
tion and dispositively founded this conclusion on a lack of any effect or influence
on plaintiffs' respective expectations and trading decisions as a result of the in-
sider's acts of trading. In short, under Fridrich, plaintiffs who trade on imper-
sonal markets lack both the requisite reliance and causation in an insider trading
action based upon a nondisclosure theory.' 85
Paraphrasing Fridrich's inquiry-but for the insider's trading, plaintiff
would not have sustained his loss-illustrates the undue hardship of its position
on loss causation. In order for a plaintiff to meet Fridrich's "but for" causation
requirement, defendant must transact at a volume that would noticably affect
the value of the security in the market. For example, if the transactions at issue
were sales of securities made by the defedant, then the quantity of such sales
must have been made at such a magnitude as to depress the security's market
177. After plaintiff argued O'Connor's duty requirement, the Laventhal court stated,
"[N]otwithstanding this reasoning, we find no standing in the present case since plaintiff and defend-
ant lacked any transactional connection in their trading." Laventhal, 704 F.2d at 413.
178. Id. at 412.
179. See id. at 413.
180. Id. at 414 (citing Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 749-50); see also Fridrich v. Bradford, 542
F.2d 307, 323 (6th Cir.) (Celebrezze, J., concurring) (recognizing the insider's vast potential for
liability and the need to limit such exposure by requiring some "causative link" between the insider's
breach of the duty to disclose and plaintiff's trading activities), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
181. Laventhal, 704 F.2d at 412. The post-Chiarella options cases uniformly recognize that a
corporation does not issue standardized option contracts.
182. Id.
183. 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 307 (1977).
184. Id. at 318.
185. But see infra note 188 and accompanying text.
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value and thus cause the plaintiff a loss. Moreover, to say the plaintiff relied on
the markets' lack of the undisclosed information appears too speculative for the
Fridrich court to accept.
186
To Fridrich and Laventhal alike, preventing the horror of a defendant's vast
exposure to liability seems to be reconciled with the allowance of certain seem-
ingly deceptive insider trades on the grounds that the investors qua investors
assume certain market risks. The Fridrich court stated that "[i]nvestors must be
prepared to accept the risk of trading in an open market without complete or
always accurate information." 18 7 This statement is preposterous. No rational
investor enters a market with the understanding that he probably will be de-
frauded in some manner. 188 His expectation is market integrity by virtue of
information dissemination. 189 Therefore, he assumes economic or financial risks
in their purest forms that do not include fraudulent or deceptive components.
In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States 190 the Supreme Court held "posi-
tive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery." 19 1 Fridrich distinguished
this holding because defendant in Affiliated Ute had engaged in face-to-face
"prior business dealings" with the plaintiffs. 192 Fridrich went on to say that this
type of relationship does not exist in impersonal markets. 193 In order to tie the
Fridrich decision into Laventhal's transactional nexus requirement, some sem-
blance of privity between the parties must exist before the potential for a rule
lOb-5 violation can even arise.194 In actions against the underlying issuer, no
semblance of privity will ever exist except in face-to-face transactions. Given the
design of the options markets, most options traders will be hard pressed to prove
some semblance of privity with individual insiders or underlying issuers, aside
from serendipity.
19 5
186. This strongly suggests that Fridrich rejects any fraud-on-the-market theory. But see Basic
Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988) (writ of certiori was granted to the Sixth Circuit to decide
whether the fraud-on-the-market theory was appropriate in order to presume reliance); Fridrich, 542
F.2d at 320 n.27 (summary of the footnote appears in the text immediately following). Interestingly,
Fridrich may have also left open the question whether an actionable breach occurs when an alleged
affirmative misrepresentation affects the market price of the stock to such an extent that a plaintiff
could reasonably rely. See Fridrich, 542 F.2d at 320 n.27.
187. Fridrich, 542 F.2d at 318.
188. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988) (quoting Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys.
Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("[I]t is hard to imagine that there ever is a buyer or
seller who does not rely on market integrity. Who would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap
game?").
189. See Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 991-92 ("An investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the
market does so in reliance upon the integrity of that price."). But see Zlotnik v. TIE Communica-
tions, 836 F.2d 818, 823 (3d Cir. 1987) (reliance on the integrity of the market is different from
reliance on the integrity of the market price).
190. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
191. Id. at 154.
192. 542 F.2d at 319.
193. Id. at 320-21.
194. But see id. at 325 (Celebrezze, J., concurring) ("Since there is no practical method for
matching purchases and sales in the open market, requiring privity in the common law sense as an
element of rule lOb-5 would create an insurmountable obstacle for plaintiffs.") (citations omitted);
see also Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 239 (2d Cir. 1974)
("privity... is not a requisite element of a Rule lOb-5 cause of action for damages").
195. In other words, proof of privity would require the fortuitous matching of the insider
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Conversely, the O'Connor line recognizes these inherent hardships and ac-
cordingly follows Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. 196 Sha-
piro recognized the virtual impossibility of identifying "a particular defendant's
sale with a particular plaintiff." 197 Shapiro, following Affiliated Ute, concluded
causation in fact may be presumed.198 Therefore, Shapiro phrased its causation
inquiry in terms of hypothetical reliance: whether, but for the insider's failure to
disclose, the plaintiff would have traded as he did. 199 In short, once a breach of
duty occurs, a resultant injury is presumed, although the plaintiff must still
prove the extent of his injury.
The second aspect of Laventhal's transactional nexus requirement narrows
any potential duty to disclose to those instances where defendant contemporane-
ously trades with the plaintiff. In the options cases, not only is a temporal con-
gruity required, but also a market congruity. In other words, it is not enough
that the defendant trades simultaneously with plaintiff, the trading must occur
within the same market-the options market.2° °
Temporal congruity addresses judicial concerns over the length of time de-
fendant is exposed to liability.20° Its premise espoused in Fridrich, for example,
is that noncontemporaneous traders "do not suffer the disadvantage of trading
with someone who has superior access to information. '20 2
Market congruity essentially perfects the contemporaneous trading require-
trader's options transaction with those of outsiders. See Langevoort, supra note 87, at 42; see also
supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text (illustrating the creation of a standardized option and the
OCC's intermediary role in the process). But see infra notes 246-47 and accompanying text (arguing
privity does exist with regard to an underlying issuer and an analogous warrant).
196. 495 F.2d 228 (1974).
197. Id. at 236; see also Fridrich, 542 F.2d at 324 (Celebrezze, J., concurring) ("IT]he mechanics
of the marketplace make it virtually impossible to identify the actual investors with whom an insider
is trading.").
198. 495 F.2d at 238-40. In turn, reliance and transactional causation are subsumed by causa-
tion in fact. Id. at 239. Furthermore, causation in fact is subsumed by a showing of materiality. Id.
at 239-40.
199. The lower court in Shapiro seems to treat an actionable insider transaction as a combination
of two elements: the ultimate trade and the failure to disclose. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264, 278 ("[I]t is not the act of trading which causes plaintiffs'
injury, it is the act oftrading without disclosing material inside information .... ) (emphasis added),
aff'd, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974). Thus, the trade itself effectuates the failure to disclose and such a
failure seems to indicate ipsofacto that a loss has occurred.
200. Laventhal, 704 F.2d at 414 (citing Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d
88 (2d Cir. 1981)); Bianco v. Texas Instruments, 627 F. Supp. 154, 164 (motion to dismiss overruled
as to individual corporate insiders alleged to have traded contemporaneously in options). But see
Backman v. Poloroid Corp., 540 F. Supp. 667, 671 (D. Mass. 1982) (overruling defendants' motion
to dismiss as to the options trader; defendants sold only stock).
201. "To extend the period of liability well beyond the time of the insider's trading simply be-
cause disclosure was never made could make the insider liable to all the world." Wilson, 648 F.2d at
94.
Conversely, Shapiro would hold open the potential class of injured plaintiffs from the time that
the insider initially trades until the time he finally discloses, if ever. 495 F.2d at 237; see also Basic
Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988) ("[Plaintiffs] are former Basic shareholders who sold their
stock after Basic's first public statements ... [and before the misstatements were rectified]."). In
Basic, for example, the length of defendants' period of potential liability would extend over 14
months. See 108 S. Ct. at 981. Virtually all the options cases, including those in the O'Connor line,
hold to the contrary and require temporal congruity for each actionable insider transaction.
202. 542 F.2d at 326 (Celebrezze, J., concurring).
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ment, which in turn connects the duty and causation requirements that consti-
tute the essence of Laventhal's transactional nexus. 20 3 It assists in making the
transaction less tangential and seeks to narrow further defendants' potential ex-
posure to liability. In one respect, market congruity is superfluous. It assumes
informational advantages used in stock transactions do not present "informa-
tional imbalances" with respect to transactions that involve the stock's corre-
sponding options contracts. 2° 4 This is not so. The option trader is at the same
informational disadvantage because the options contract's value is correlative to
the value of the underlying securities. In efforts to protect the fraudulent insider
from exposure to unlimited liability, Laventhal here allows a prudent insider a
virtual free reign over options traders.
The situation has not yet been addressed in which an insider trades exclu-
sively in either calls or puts and the plaintiff trades exclusively in the other.
Because the call and put contracts are exclusive in their respective origins and
subsequent secondary trading markets, the lack of any kind of relationship be-
tween the parties would appear to negate any transactional privity, or for that
matter, any transactional nexus under Laventhal. In addition, the price or trad-
ing volume of the type of options contracts that the insider did not trade would
not directly reflect any of the insider's trading activities, even if such trading
were based upon confidential information and done contemporaneously with the
plaintiff's trading. Therefore, in order to satisfy the reliance requirement, a
court would have to accept plaintiff's argument that the options market in
which he traded and its corresponding market volume and price data reflected a
deceptive absence of the undisclosed information that allowed the insider to
profit from trading the other.
In order to clarify the perspective of the next portion of this Comment's
discussion-the affirmative misrepresentation cases-the previous analyses re-
garding insider trading or nondisclosure actions should be briefly summarized.
The O'Connor decision confronts the unfair rigidity of rule lOb-5's judicially
evolved rule structure as it applies to the unique situation of the modern options
trader. While the Laventhal line seemingly disregards the coverage of the 1934
Act 20 5 as well as the purposes behind rule lOb-5, 20 6 O'Connor does not. By
requiring temporal congruity in trading, both lines of cases aptly recognize the
potential for liability far beyond a culpable insider's actual profits and seek prac-
tical limitations. But the Laventhal line, through its requirement of market con-
gruity, opens "a large loophole for individual insiders to profit from confidential
203. See Laventhal, 704 F.2d at 414 ("Here, although it would appear there are sufficient allega-
tions of contemporaneous trading, it is clear there is only a speculative nexus between Laventhal, as
an options holder, and the corporate insiders dealing with stock.").
204. Laventhal, 704 F.2d at 144 ("IThere was no informational imbalance in the separate trans-
actions performed by the [defendant and plaintiff] because they in no way can be said to have been
'trading' with one another.").
205. The 1934 Act was intended to cover all national markets. H.R. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 11 (1934).
206. "The 'disclose or abstain' rule accomplishes two salutary purposes of rule 10b-5: it insures
the integrity of the marketplace and it compensates for the inequity of trading with a corporate
insider .. " Fridrich, 542 F.2d at 324 (Celebrezze, J., concurring) (citation and footnote omitted).
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information." 207 In allowing this loophole, the Laventhal line fails to recognize
the interdependence between the options and stock values, in addition to a gen-
eral need for market integrity.
B. The Affirmative Misrepresentation Cases
In several areas of law, the duty to speak truthfully when one has chosen to
speak is axiomatic. 20 8 Courts have historically found misfeasance to be a more
palatable wrong than nonfeasance. 20 9 The pre-Chiarella options cases under
rule lOb-5 were no exception.210 Material affirmative misrepresentations are ex-
pressly prohibited by section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, while nondisclosure or insider
trading theories may require some extrapolation.2 11 Nevertheless, the options
cases decided after Chiarella are split once again as to whether options traders
are owed the duty to speak truthfully.
Those decisions that refuse to impose such a duty2 12 follow Laventhal's
statement that underlying issuers and their insiders generally owe no duties to
options traders.213 In addressing affirmative misrepresentations, the approach
announced in the Laventhal decision, which focuses upon to whom a duty is
owed fails to recognize the duty of the underlying issuer. Before any statement
is made, the lack of an existing duty to options traders might have some merit.
Once one has chosen to speak, however, a separate duty to speak truthfully2 14 or
to correct a material prior statement that has become materially misleading 21 s
clearly arises.
Correspondingly, this duty should be owed to all those who would reason-
ably be expected to hear and reasonably rely on the statement. 2 16 The culpable
207. Langevoort, supra note 87, at 42.
208. See generally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 736-49 (5th ed. 1985) (discussing the legal distinction between nonfeasance and
active misrepresentation) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. In the area of federal securities law, see
First Virginia Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1317 (5th Cir.) ("[A] duty to speak the full
truth arises when a defendant undertakes to say anything."), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978); Et-
shokin v. Texasgulf, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1212, 1217 (N.D. Il. 1984) ("We think the latter holding
conflicts with the principle that one who has spoken must under rule lob-5 speak the whole truth.")
[hereinafter Etshokin 1]. Cf Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988) (implying that one who
has once spoken undertakes a duty to speak truthfully).
209. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 208, at 736-37.
210. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Industrial Bio-Test Laboratories, 454 F. Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (dis-
cussed supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text).
211. Compare rule 10b-5(2) (expressly prohibiting affirmative misstatements) with Rule lOb-5(l)
& (3) (implicitly prohibiting insider trading). See supra note 10 (illustrating rule 10b-5).
212. Bianco v. Texas Instruments Inc., 627 F. Supp. 154 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (regarding the affirma-
tive misrepresentation action against the underlying issuer); Starkman v. Warner Communications,
671 F. Supp. 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); see also Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 668 F. Supp. 358 (D.
Del.), rev'd, 841 F.2d 502 (3d Cir. 1988) (distinguishing Laventhal and refusing to apply it to cases
involving affirmative misrepresentations made to the public).
In all the cases above, the affirmative misrepresentation charges were brought against the under-
lying issuer.
213. Eg., Deutschman, 668 F. Supp. at 361-62; Starkman, 671 F. Supp. at 302-04.
214. See Deutschman, 841 F.2d at 506.
215. See supra note 10 (quoting rule lOb-5(b)).
216. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS states:
One who makes a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liability to the persons or class
[Vol. 671148
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actor should be able to reasonably foresee or "assume from appearances" that
his statements will reach options traders.217 This is evident when the actor's
statement is issued in the form of a public release or announcement and a well-
established market in the particular options contracts exists. In such a case, the
plaintiff's status as a nonequity investor or the fact that a defendant did not
actually issue the options contract becomes meaningless, as does any discussion
of transactional privity.
2 18
Given the correlation between stock and options values, to say that options
traders rely on the misstatements less than shareholders, or alternatively to say
that given the speculative nature of the options contracts, options traders assume
risks of active fraud, is senseless. 219 The decisions that implicitly reason so
220
imply that options trading is on the same level of social undesirability as
gambling.2
21
Before examining those cases that extend options traders a duty to speak
truthfully, several concluding points may be noted. The Chiarella decision dealt
solely with a nondisclosure action.222 Laventhal too addressed only the duty to
disclose. Hence the Laventhal decision may have left open the question of any
duty to speak truthfully in an affirmative misrepresentation action.223 Even
Judge Cardozo in his oft-cited opinion Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven &
Co. 224 implied that concerns over "a liability in an indeterminate amount for an
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class"225 may be less significant in the
case of intentional misrepresentation.
226
When a verbal or written statement has been made and incorporated into
of persons whom he intends or has reason to expect to act or to refrain from action in
reliance upon the misrepresentation,forpecuniary loss suffered by them through their justi-
fiable reliance in the type of transaction in which he intends or has reason to expect their
conduct to be influenced.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531 (1981) (emphasis added); see also id. at comment c (sub-
stantial certainty), d (reasonable expectations), e & f (class of individuals).
217. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 208, at 745.
218. Because the plaintiff's losses would presumably be caused by his reliance upon misstate-
ments and by their subsequent effects, the contemporaneous trading requirement would appear to be
inapplicable. See Deutschman, 841 F.2d at 506 (rejecting the applicability of Laventhal and
Chiarella).
219. See Deutschman, 841 F.2d at 507 ("[S]ince the price of option contracts is closely depen-
dent upon the price of the underlying stocks, the degree of risk involved in trading in one over the
other is not self-evidently greater.").
220. See Deutschman, 668 F. Supp. at 364 ("There is no reason why options traders, who have
chosen a greater risk... and do not meaningfully contribute to capital formation, should recover at
the expense of the corporation's shareholders.").
221. See, e.g., id. at 364. But see id. at 507 (rejecting defendants' argument that "purchasers of
option contracts... are entitled to less protection under the 1934 Act because option trading, like
blackjack or craps, is 'gambling' ").
222. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
223. Cf Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 320 n.27 ("We specifically do not reach the question
of availability of the [rule lob-5] remedy to open market situations where the insider trading with
resultant price changes has in fact induced the plaintiffs to buy or sell to their injury."), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
224. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
225. Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
226. Id. at 186, 174 N.E. at 447-48.
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the value of the underlying stock, 227 the option's correlative value will follow. 2 2 8
Those who invest in options in reliance on such statements satisfy reliance and
causation requirements in a manner far less attenuated than satisfying the same
requirements in actions involving alleged nondisclosure. The cases that have
extended options traders the duty to speak truthfully still impose heavy eviden-
tiary burdens upon the plaintiff with respect to showing reliance, materiality,
and causation. 229 If a misstatement caused the plaintiff to immediately trade
thereupon, then to allow presumptions here would seem to be unfair to the de-
fendant, because the market would not have been affected by the mistatement.
If trading occurs later on, however, presumptive reliance makes more sense.
An interesting application of the reliance requirement arises when the fol-
lowing series of commonplace options transactions occurs. Suppose an options
trader writes calls, then a misrepresentation occurs that causes a rise in the value
of the underlying securities, and consequent to such rise the options trader
chooses to cover his position.
2 30
From his initial sale of calls, the options trader believes that the underlying
securities are overvalued and thus relies "on the market's ability, given accurate
information, to correct" the value in the future.2 31 In essence, the options writer
relies both on "the integrity of the market"232 and the underlying securities'
future value in order to obtain profits.233 Here, however, defendant "[b]y inflat-
ing the price of the stock" has "interfered with the market's ability to correct
itself."23 4 If the misrepresentation causes the price of the underlying securities
227. This theory is called the efficient-capital-market theory. See Dennis, Materiality and the
Efficient Capital Market Model: A Recipe for the Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 373 n. 1,
374-81 (1984); see also In re LTV Securities Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 133, 134 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (citing
literature on the theory).
228. See Rubenstein, supra note 31, at 54-55.
229. Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 841 F.2d 502 (3d Cir. 1988) (upholding an option trader's
action against the underlying issuer and two insiders and expressly rejecting the applicability of
Laventhal and Chiarella); In re Digital Equip. Corp. Sec. Litig., 601 F. Supp. 311 (D. Mass. 1984)
(upholding options trader's action against underlying issuer and expressly rejecting the application
of Laventhal in affirmative misrepresentation actions); Etshokin 1, 612 F. Supp. at 1212 certain insid-
ers' motions to dismiss overruled and underlying issuer and other corporate insiders' motions to
dismiss granted but upon a finding at law of no breach of the duty owed to the option trader); see
also Etshokin v. Texusgulf, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1220, 1229 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (holding in part that the
duty to speak truthfully is owed to options traders) [hereinafter Etshokin II]. Cf. Weintraub v.
Texasgulf, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1466 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (overruling certain individual defendants' mo-
tion for summary judgment).
230. For cases with comparable fact patterns, see Deutschman, 668 F. Supp. at 299-301; Et-
shokin I, 612 F. Supp. at 1213; 601 West Corp. v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 882, 883
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); see also Zlotnik v. TIE Communications, 836 F.2d 818, 823 (3d Cir. 1987) (involv-
ing the a similar fact pattern, but with an analogous "short" sale of stock).
Covering a position means that instead of risking the potential delivery of the written options
contract's underlying securities, the writer alternatively purchases a call option of the same series
from the secondary market. Thus, the options writer has effectively substituted someone else's obli-
gation to deliver for his own. If the option holder requires the writer is chosen to perform and
deliver the underlying securities, the writer simply makes a similar demand upon the options con-
tracts which he had subsequently purchased.
231. Zlotnik, 836 F.2d at 823.
232. Id. (emphasis added).
233. Cf. id.
234. Id.
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to move up to a price level that prompts the options trader to cover, or the
trader does not so choose to cover but is consequently called to deliver the un-
derlying securities according to the options contract, the costs of either transac-
tion are directly attributable to defendant's wrongful conduct. The question
then becomes whether reliance has occurred on either the subsequent covering
or delivery transaction, and in addition, whether reliance may be presumed.
In Zlotnick v. TIE Communications,235 a case that involved an analogous
"short" sale of stock where the short seller chose to cover his position,236 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit disallowed plaintiff's the-
ory of presumed reliance on the market's natural ability to correct.237 However,
the court did overrule defendant's motion to dismiss and allowed plaintiff an
opportunity to show either "actual" or "actual indirect" reliance.2 38 It follows
from Zlotnik, and more recently from Basic,239 that an options writer who relies
on the integrity of the market price of the underlying securities and chooses to
cover could raise a presumption of reliance.
24
0
A paramount policy consideration is the concern over defendant's potential
exposure to liability in actions for affirmative misrepresentations. Burdens of
proof are one way to alleviate the concern. Another ingenious way is to net all
losses and gains from all transactions that follow from the misstatement to as-
sure that plaintiffs recover for only actual economic injury in the aggregate. 24 1
These methods, however, impose no limits on the length of time to which de-
fendant should be exposed to potential liability.
Under Shapiro the potential class of plaintiffs would remain open until the
misstatement has been rectified, if ever.242 The other approach, limiting the pe-
riod of liability only to the period in which the defendant contemporaneously
trades, is erroneous. 24 3 This Comment advocates a compromise position that
235. 836 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1987).
236. Plaintiff, a "short" seller, covered his position by prematurely purchasing shares before his
obligation to repay the shares arose in an effort to minimize potential loss. See id. at 820-21 (explain-
ing the mechanics of the "short" sale).
237. Id. at 823 (plaintiff asserted reliance on the market rather than on the market price). See
supra notes 231-34 and accompanying text (discussing this distinction).
238. Zlotnik, 836 F.2d at 824. Actual indirect reliance is a fraud-on-the-market theory whereby
the plaintiff relies on the "integrity of the market price" or the present value of the stock. Id.; see
also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988) (affirming a lower court's use of the same theory to
raise the presumption of reliance).
239. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 991-92 (1988) (affirming a lower court's use of a fraud-on-the-market
theory to raise a presumption of reliance).
240. Cf. Deutschman, 841 F.2d at 504 ("[The complaint] alleges that Deutschman suffered losses
when, upon disclosure of the facts, call options on Beneficial stock that he had purchased in reliance
on the market price created by defendant's misstatements, became worthless."); Starkman v. Warner
Communications, 671 F. Supp. 297, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (referring to the oral argument on defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment, "[P]laintiffs all but admit that they did not rely on either the
alleged material misrepresentations or the market price.").
241. In Etshokin 11 the court netted all options losses and gains arising after the alleged miscon-
duct (misrepresentations) to conclude that plaintiff had not sustained actual damages under § 28(a).
See Etshokin II, 612 F. Supp. at 1231-34. The gains resulted from the appreciation in value from
options purchased in covering transactions. See supra text accompanying note 230 (describing the
particular transaction in Etshokin II).
242. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 218.
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would extend the period of potential liability from the time of the misstatement
to the time in which the misstatement was fully absorbed in the market. 244 Ob-
viously this timespan does not cover those who rely actually on the misstate-
ments or indirectly on the integrity of the market price past the time of full
absorbtion, but some allowable recovery better serves the injured class and up-
holds market integrity better than no recovery. In order to soften the harshness
of an arbitrarily limited class of potential plaintiffs, the burden of proving the
open liability period could be fairly put upon defendant. After all, the perpetra-
tor has voluntarily chosen his own course of action.
C. Special Situations
Stock warrants and stock rights. Warrants and rights present other unique
scenarios. Like standardized call options, both give the holder a right to buy
prescribed securities. They are also expressly defined as securities under the
1934 Act's section 3(a)(10). 245 Unlike standardized options contracts, warrants
and rights can originate with the underlying issuer. 246 If so, the requisite trans-
actional nexus between the underlying issuer and purchaser conceivably exists
under the Laventhal line. In actions for misrepresentation based upon the origi-
nal issuance of warrants or rights, little argument can be made that the contem-
poraneous trading requirement has not been met, even if Laventhal is the chosen
precedent.247 However, problems may arise with the contemporaneous trading
requirement if the charge is insider trading on secondary markets. 248
Secondary market transactions involving warrants and rights pose the same
types of concerns that arise when secondary market transactions involving stan-
dardized options are involved. Under Laventhal, no distinguishing factor exists
when individual insiders trade in warrants or stock rights that would require any
modification to the temporal and market congruity, and causation requirements.
In addition, if applied to rule lOb-5 actions involving warrants or rights, the
principles in those decisions that have recognized various duties owed to options
traders should not change given the additional semblance of privity inherent
with warrants and rights.
Index options.249 Actions that involve market index options could present
244. See Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 853-54 (stating that insiders may commence trad-
ing once the market has fully absorbed the disclosed information).
245. 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(10) (1982).
246. See, e.g., R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 524 (1984).
247. See Starkman v. Warner Communications, 671 F. Supp. 297, 298-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(plaintiffs were also purchasers of warrants; defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted
only as to the options-based claim); Kusner v. First Pa. Corp., 531 F.2d 1234, 1239 (3d Cir. 1976)
("If [warrant] purchasers can prove that they parted with that consideration as a result of material
misrepresentations in a prospectus, they may recover in a direct action .... "); see also Lutgert v.
Vanderbilt Bank, 508 F.2d 1035 (7th Cir. 1975) (plaintiff's rule lOb-5 action involved stock rights
issued in conjunction with an original issuance of stock; action dismissed on other grounds-plaintiff
was not entitled initially to any of the rights).
248. Secondary markets are the markets in which transactions subsequent to the initial sales of
securities to the initial purchasers take place.
249. See supra note 25 and supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing various index op-
tions available for trading).
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potential plaintiffs with insurmountable obstacles. Decisions that choose to fol-
low Laventhal should bar actions under either affirmative misrepresentation or
nondislosure (including insider trading) theories. Not even a scintilla of privity
exists to sustain actions against corporate issuers of securities who comprise a
percentage of the index's weighted value. Equally troublesome, even to those
courts that have sustained options traders' actions, is the causation requirement.
To illustrate, suppose XYZ Corp. comprises ten percent of the S & P 100's250
weighted value. Assume further that when a previous misrepresentation is subse-
quently rectified, it occurs on the same day the United States Government issues
an unfavorable report that bears upon the future state of the economy. If the
value of a given class of S & P 100 options drops fifty percent, then how much
can or should be attributable to the misrepresentation? Absent such a dramatic
governmental release, what percentage of a loss, if any, can be attributed to a
drop in value following a misrepresentation? As to the latter, fifteen percent of
the fifty percent decline might appear logical at first glance. But this assumes far
too much given the enormous complexity of other market forces at work on the
ninety-nine other companies that comprise the index.
Reliance presents another problem. Assuming that an allegation of insider
trading is involved and defendant is an insider of one of the index's component
corporations, to be actionable under Laventhal and Fridrich, the insider's con-
temporaneous trading of the pertinent class of index options contracts must have
been of such an extraordinary magnitude as to create a cognizable change in the
index's value upon which the plaintiff must rely. If the insider were held liable
on the fraud-on-the-market theory, she would theoretically be liable to all those
who traded in all the market index options of which the pertinent underlying
issue constitutes a component.
Stock brokers. When a stock broker trades a plaintiff's account fraudu-
lently using options contracts, rule lOb-5 affords a cause of action. Under non-
disclosure and affirmative misrepresentation theories, options traders' actions
against their brokers generally have been upheld.2 51 Given the face-to-face na-
ture of the transactions, fraudulent broker transactions should not present any
unduly harsh burdens of proving materiality, reliance, and causation. 252 Even if
Laventhal is the chosen precedent, broker-agents owe fiduciary-like duties to
their client-principals. 253 The relevant issue in these cases usually has been
whether the client-options trader has engaged in a requisite purchase or sale of
section 3(a)(10) securities.
Although the cases that involved options-based rule lOb-5 actions against
brokers number surprisingly few,2 5 4 Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc.
2 5 5 com-
250. See supra note 25 (discussing this particular index option).
251. See cases cited infra notes 254-56.
252. Given the face-to-face transaction, Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128
(1972), would appear to control and presumptions may arise. See supra notes 190-92 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Affiliated Ule).
253. See Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 152.
254. For other cases that involved rule lOb-5 actions against brokers see Prudential-Bache Se-
curities, Inc. v. Cullenther, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,421, at 97, 188
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prehensively examined the status of an options trader's brokerage account
against the definitional provisions of section 3(a)(10). The court found that when
options that satisfy section 3(a)(10) are traded within the plaintiff's account, a
valid rule lob-5 action may be based thereupon. 25 6 Alternatively, the Savino
court found that the plaintiff's arrangement with the broker constituted a sec-
tion 3(a)(10) "investment contract.
'2 57
VI. STANDING TO SUE AND OPTIONS TRADERS
With the previous analyses of the requirements of an options trader's rule
lOb-5 action as a guide, the following discussion of the theoretical standing re-
quirements as applied to options traders is relatively straightforward. The pur-
chaser/seller aspect of the injury in fact requirement and the prudential
concerns regarding section 10(b)'s protected zone of interests warrant particular
attention. The other general standing requirements can be dispensed with rather
quickly.
In terms of fairness,258 tracing an options trader's economic injury to a
defendant's conduct otherwise culpable under rule lob-5 has been discussed pre-
viously. 259 Simply put, standing to sue under Rule lOb-5 should extend to plain-
tiffs who sue the individual culpable actors and not the underlying issuer. The
redressability requirement2 60 presents no problems. A favorable decision pursu-
ant to a request for monetary damages or injunctive relief will certainly alleviate
the past or future harm that an options trader can incur.26 1 An options trader's
rule lob-5 action will not founder on the courts' prudential considerations, be-
(E.D. Va. 1987); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Del Valle, 528 F. Supp. 147 (S.D. Fla.
1981); Alvord v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 848 (D. Conn. 1980); see infra cases
cited in note 256.
255. 507 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
256. Id.; Gutter v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 644 F.2d 1194 (6th Cir.) (hold-
ing an options writer writing through his brokerage account was a seller of securities under the 1934
Act), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982); see also Pierson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 551 F. Supp.
497 (C.D. Ill. 1982) (upholding plaintiff's rule lOb-5 action; options contracts were traded in a
nondiscretionary account); Darrell v. Goodman, [1979-80 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,349, at 97,325-26 (S.D.N.Y 1980) (trades of individual securities within a brokerage account
can satisfy the purchaser/seller requirement).
257. Savino, 507 F. Supp. at 1236-39. Unlike standardized options contracts, commodities fu-
tures contracts are not § 3(a)(10) securities. Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Costantino, 493 F.2d
1027, 1033 (2d Cir. 1974). Because a commodities trader cannot therefore base a rule lOb-5 action
upon the contract itself, his trading account's status as a § 3(a)(10) "investment contract" becomes
quite significant. For citations of numerous cases that have addressed the commodities account-
investment contract issue, see Savino, 507 F. Supp. at 1235-36 n.8.
258. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 154-89 and accompanying text.
After a close reading of Laventhal, one is tempted to infer that the case addressed the fair
traceability aspect of the standing doctrine. Laventhal's reliance on Chiarella's duty requirement
would strongly suggest otherwise and Laventhal should be interpreted as addressing an options
trader's cause of action under rule lOb-5. Further supporting this proposition, Chiarella addressed
whether defendant's conduct was criminally culpable under rule lob-5. See supra notes 127-38.
Chiarella did not involve in any respect the standing to sue doctrine. Therefore, this Comment has
addressed Laventhal in a narrow sense, as the decision bore only upon an option trader's rule lOb-5
cause of action.
260. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
261. But see infra note 286 and following text (discussing standing to sue in equity).
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cause the action does not require adjudication of a generalized grievance or an
abstract question. 262 A court is specifically requested to determine whether con-
duct has been fraudulent under a statute and its attendant rules.
A. Injury in Fact: the Purchaser/Seller Aspect
It would appear that a purchase or sale of an options contract satisfies the
injury in fact requirement for standing.263 The only issue, then, is whether a
purchase or sale has occurred. The purchaser/seller requirement as applied to
options traders is unique in two significant respects. First, an options contract is
itself a security under section 3(a)(10). 264 Second, the options contract is recog-
nized as a purchase or sale of the contract's underlying securities. 265 Thus,
when an options trader writes an option, the transaction constitutes a sale of
securities. 266 Alternatively, when an options trader buys an option, the transac-
tion constitutes a purchase of securities.
267
A more difficult scenario arises when the plaintiff has foregone an opportu-
nity to purchase the option's underlying stock. This situation, which occurred
in Blue Chip Stamps, involves what Professor Hazen describes as a "frustrated
purchaser. '26 8 The notion of frustration has an interesting twist in its applica-
tion to options contracts. For example, suppose an options trader purchases call
options in expectation that the value of the underlying securities will move up-
ward. Subsequent to her purchase, a public misstatement of negative press
drives down the options contracts' values within her series to the point of worth-
lessness. If unable to sell at the time of the options contract's expiration date,
the holder has two choices. She can humbly elect to take her losses by allowing
the contracts to expire. Alternatively, she can exercise her right to buy the un-
derlying securities, most assuredly at a price above the prevailing market price.
If she chooses the latter course, under Blue Chip Stamps she would be a pur-
chaser, but of the underlying securities.2 69 But if the former course is chosen,
can it be said that the option trader has been effectively forced to sell her
securities?
In the former course of action above, an options trader who was similarly
situated would seek to resell his original purchases in an attempt to recover at
least something. However, if the options value is worthless or nearly worthless,
there may not be any receptive buyers on the secondary market. Therefore, a
262. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 126 (quoting § 3(a)(10)).
265. See supra note 106 (quoting the applicable passage in Blue Chip Stamps and § § 3(a)(13) &
(14)).
266. See, e.g., Deutschman, 841 F.2d at 506-07; Gutter, 644 F.2d at 1196-97; see also supra note
126 (quoting § 3(a)(10)).
267. Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 540 F. Supp. 667, 671 (D. Mass. 1982); see also supra note 126
(quoting § 3(a)(10)).
268. T. HAZEN, supra note 84, at 454.
269. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 725-28.
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high probability exists that the options trader's loss will be total upon the con-
tract's expiration.
In this particular situation, the options trader should be viewed as a forced
seller.270 Unlike stocks, options contracts have extremely short lives. After the
expiration date, all rights expire and no second chance for value recovery ex-
ists.27 ' Furthermore, a clearly identifiable event has transpired in which actual
monetary loss has occurred; no speculation exists here. 272 To require the
purchase of the option's underlying securities in order to perfect standing would
create enormous economic waste and in addition increase the plaintiff's poten-
tial loss. 273 For these reasons, an options trader who is similarly situated and
who makes reasonable efforts to resell in order to minimize her losses, but due to
options market dynamics cannot successfully do so, should be deemed a seller
upon expiration of the held contracts. She is, in essence, a forced seller.
Just as there can be forced sellers of options contracts, so can there be
forced buyers of options contracts. 274 The forced buyer situation arises when,
for example, an options trader who has previously written call options confronts
the dilemma whether to cover his potential obligation to deliver the underlying
shares or simply take his chances and if called, then deliver. 275 To these latter,
"naked," options writers, such a dilemma in a practical sense will likely ever
arise. Given the choice between purchasing and delivering underlying shares
perhaps at a cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars, and purchasing cover
options at a few thousand dollars, only one alternative really exists: COVERI
If a naked options writer in this situation chooses to cover, surely his cover-
ing transaction should constitute a requisite purchase. 276 By contrast, if covered
options are involved and the options writer chooses to perform and delivers se-
curities that he currently holds, technical problems with the purchaser/seller
requirement may arise.
2 77
B. Section 1O(b)'s Zone of Interests
Until the amendments to the 1934 Act's definitional provisions occurred in
1982,278 the issue whether the interests of options traders came within the zone
of interests protected by the 1934 Act caused much difficulty. The 1934 Act's
original definitional provisions did not state that options contracts were "securi-
270. See T. HAZEN, supra note 84, at 454-56.
271. See supra note 29.
272. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
273. The additional loss is represented by the extent of the cost of stock purchased to deliver in
the case of a naked option or to the extent of the market value of the stock held and delivered in the
case of a covered option.
274. "When the market price of [the underlying stock] rose as a result of the [disclosure of the
truth], [the plaintiff] was forced to cover the options he had sold." Etshokin 11, 612 F. Supp. at 1227
(emphasis added).
275. See the fact patterns in supra notes 230 and 236.
276. E.g., Etshokin 11, 612 F. Supp. at 1231-34 (illustrating that the proper rule lOb-5 transac-
tions were the covering transactions).
277. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text (discussing Solitron Devices),
278. See supra note 126 (quoting § 3(a)(10) as amended).
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ties." 279 In addition, the 1934 Act's legislative history provides little help.
2 80
Furthermore, support for the proposition that the zone of interests protected by
the 1934 Act did not include options traders is intuitively derived from the fact
that standardized stock options and national options markets did not exist at the
time of the 1934 Act's passage. However, in support of the proposition that
options traders' interests were protected before 1982, the Act's legislative history
was clearly designed to broadly cover national markets' participants. 2 8' In addi-
tion, section 10(b) applied, and still does apply, to "a purchaser or seller of 'any
security' against 'any person' who has used 'any manipulative device or
contrivance.' "282
In 1982, Congress officially amended section 3(a)(10)'s definition of "secur-
ity" to include options. The effect of the 1982 Amendments is to include ex-
pressly options traders' interests under section 10(b)'s protections. 283 Thus, the
issue of whether options traders come within the zone of interests protected by
the 1934 Act has finally been taken from the realm of dispute; no longer will the
courts be able to dismiss options traders' standing based on judicial considera-
tions. As another consequence, the nature of the plaintiff's theory of fraud
(nondisclosure or affirmative misrepresentation) should not matter for purposes
of determining standing under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.
2 84
One sound policy consideration does, however, stand out in support for
allowing options traders standing to sue in general. Private actions aid enforce-
ment of the federal securities laws for violations "that might otherwise go unde-
tected due to the SEC's limited resources. ' 285 This supplemental enforcement
theory as applied to the standing issue makes much sense-if only from the
standpoint of the sheer number of options trades that occur. Given the huge
increase in options trading, the SEC cannot conceivably monitor, let alone effi-
ciently prosecute, all the insider trades.
C. Standing to Sue and Equitable Relief
Finally, some courts have relaxed the purchaser/seller requirement and
granted plaintiffs standing under section 10(b)'s rule lOb-5 when equitable relief
279. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(10) (1976) (as an example of the pre-1982 version of§ 3(a)(10)).
280. As one court recently stated:
[The question of what constitutes the proper plaintiff class under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5
cannot be conclusively determined by resort to the text of those enactments; as one might expect,
neither the statute nor the law speaks directly to the question of who may sue since the right to sue
was created afterwards by the judiciary. Cowin v. Bressler, 741 F.2d 410, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(citations omitted); see also Note, supra note 164, at 1962 (stating the same).
281. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934).
282. Herman & McClean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983).
283. See supra note 126 (quoting § 3(a)(10) as amended).
284. See also H.R. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 11 (1934) ("Just as artificial manipulation
tends to upset the true function of an open market, so the hiding and secreting of important informa-
tion obstructs the operation of the markets as indices of real value."). This quotation suggests that
section 10(b) was intended to prohibit insider trading as well as affirmative misrepresentations, and
that Congress has always thought the misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction to be meaningless under
section 10(b).
285. Note, supra note 164, at 1963 n.24 (citing Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 25 (1977);
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964)).
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rather than money damages was requested.2 8 6 Blue Chip Stamps would appear
to allow derivative suits, but only if the corporation were a purchaser or
seller.28 7 It would seem odd indeed to allow an options trader standing to bring
a derivative suit. To obtain injunctive relief, the plaintiff must first prove the
substantially likelihood that he will prevail on the merits. But if he has no cause
of action in the first place, it would be erroneous to allow him standing to seek,
equitable relief. Therefore, unless the options trader is at least in a position of a
forced buyer or seller, he should not have standing to sue for equitable relief.
III. CONCLUSION
To determine whether options traders have standing to sue under section
10(b) and rule 10b-5, one must first ascertain whether options traders possess a
judicially cognizable cause of action. With regard to actions based on insider
trading, the dominant view under Laventhal clearly requires the existence of
transactional nexus between the insider's and plaintiff's trading. This can only
be accomplished when both trade contemporaneously in the same type of op-
tions contracts. Conversely, the minority view under O'Connor extends the ab-
stain or disclose duty to the entire investing public, including options traders.
The result for those jurisdictions adopting O'Connor will be a recognition of the
economic realities that affect options trading and an allowance of more section
10(b) and rule lOb-5 actions based on options transactions.
With regard to affirmative misrepresentation actions under rule lOb-5,
Laventhal's approach is misplaced. The recent trend recognizes this and is prop-
erly heading toward a jurisdictional expansion of the duty to speak truthfully to
national market participants, including options traders. 288 Correspondingly, a
long-awaited wider acceptance of presumptive reliance based on an options
trader's reasonable reliance on the integrity of the market price should quickly
follow.
Just because a cause of action exists, standing does not automatically fol-
low. The purchaser/seller requirement is essential to the standing determination
with regard to actions based on options trading. Therefore, the courts need to be
sensitive to the uniqueness of the options contracts. Courts must recognize the
interdependency of the options markets and other national securities markets in
order to tailor the standing requirements accordingly. In addition, courts must
endeavor to understand the nontraditional ways that an option "purchase or
sale" can occur so that plaintiffs who otherwise have suffered actual economic
harm are not erroneously dismissed for lack of standing because of a misunder-
286. See, eg., Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970);
Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967). Contra Cowin v. Bresler, 741
F.2d 410, 419-25 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting any relaxation of the purchaser/seller requirement
based on Blue Chip Stamps).
287. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 738 (citing Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 219 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969)).
288. See generally Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 841 F.2d 502 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that
options traders are owed certain disclosure duties and expressly rejecting the application of
Laventhal and Chiarella in actions of affirmative misrepresentation).
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standing of a transaction's economics. Furthermore, one court one day will
have to come to grips with the significance of section 3(a)(10)'s amendment in
1982. By amending the definition of a security under the 1934 Act, Congress
appears to have expressly granted standing under section 10(b) by virtue of the
change. If so, the Judiciary cannot construct standing barriers except for the
purpose of maintaining the integrity of Article III. By virtue of Blue Chip
Stamps' sanctification of the purchaser/seller requirement, such integrity is ef-
fectively maintained.
To answer the question whether options traders have standing to sue under
section 10(b): yes, if they are at the least forced purchasers or sellers, but only if
they indeed have a cause of action.
DANIEL T. WHITE

